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PREFACE 
Overlooking the small industrial city of Monfalcone, Italy, sits a fifteenth century 
fortification, called La Rocca. Encircling the edifice are several levels of bunkers and 
trenches, artifacts of the First World War. Local legend asserts that La Rocca sits upon the 
foundation of a fort established by Theodosius as he passed from Italy to the Eastern Empire 
in the fourth century. He used the traditional route through the Julian Alps, a passage not 
only permitting the eastward extension of Roman authority, but also facilitating the 
introduction of Celtic, Gothic and Byzantine cultures into the Italian peninsula by migration, 
invasion and by commerce. The Celts, illyrians, Romans, Goths, Huns, Lombards, A vars and 
countless others used this gateway to Italy. 
Approximately three miles from Monfalcone lies in the town of Redipuglia, 
I Cento Mila. a massive Italian national memorial to those who died in battle on the 
Carso during the First World War. This memorial contains 100,000 graves, while 
across the street from this site lies an Austrian cemetery. In both burial grounds 
Italian, German, and Slavic names are inscribed on the stone tablets, Crosses, and 
Stars of David. Even today in Monfalcone people carry names such as Padovan, 
Cusin, Streiker, and Biziac, reflecting the ethnic mix of Venetian, Friulian, German, 
and Slovene, respectively. Five miles to the north of Monfalcone the town of 
Doberdo' contains a Slovene ethnic majority, yet Doberdo' is not on Slovene soil, 
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for the Slovene border is fixed two miles away across the rail line which runs 
north-south from Trieste to Gorizia and northward to Klagenfurt in Austria. 
To the southeast ofMonfalcone, the great port-city of Trieste sits at the 
head of the Adriatic Sea, with its commercial metropolitan center and port in Italy 
and its suburbs in Slovenia. Since its founding in 200 BC, Trieste linked central 
Europe with the Mediterranean and was a focal point of territorial dispute among 
the ethnic groups representing the three great European cultures--Latin, Germ~ 
and Slav. Today the land surrounding Trieste belongs to two nations, Italy and 
Slovenia. It is called Venezia-Giulia· The ethnic and national pressures for 
irredentism in this area influenced the course of modem European history. The 
friction caused by irredentist aspirations for Austro-Hungarian lands stirred Italy to 
enter the First World War on the side of the Allies, while during the Second World 
War these ambitions for the lands within the newly created Yugoslavia helped lead 
the Italians to join the Axis Powers. In the years following the Second World War, 
the dispute for lands persisted between Italy and Yugoslavia, and the conflict over 
the boundaries of Venezia-Giulia became a concern of the Great Powers. 
In 1975 a team of Italian military engineers headed by a colonel met its 
Yugoslav counterpart and conducted a survey of the borders between their two 
nations. Even though the Cold War kept East and West apart, the two former 
enemies cordially cooperated to finalize the frontiers. The teams ran into practical 
difficulties in trying to fit a line drawn by politicians onto the actual terrain. For 
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example, in the city of Gorizia, they found that the frontier line ran directly through 
a cemetery, spllt several roads in two and even divided several dwellings. The 
teams simply took the easiest method available and divided the city east and west of 
the Isonzo (Soca) River. This survey resulted in the Treaty of Osimo which helped 
end over seventy years of conflict between several peoples and nations. 
This thesis describes the long historical road which led to the Treaty of 
Osimo and of the many obstructions created by Italian and South Slav nationalism 
and irredentism over Venezia-Giulia. Numerous scholars have written about the 
open Italian-Yugoslav conflict which surfaced during and immediately following 
World War II, and most of their works have been consulted, and many of them 
have been referred to in this thesis. The most formidable work on Venezia-Giulia 
and Trieste, published in 1970, is that of Bogdan Novak of the University of 
Chicago. Novak concentrates on the geopolitical aspects of the conflict over 
Trieste and only briefly describes the background of ethnic tensions between 
Italians and South Slavs. While more recent studies dealing with the region further 
address specific political and social issues of the post-war period, there is a paucity 
of English language literature on the underlying tensions resulting from the rise of 
ethnic and national consciousness among the peoples of Venezia-Giulia: Slovenes, 
Croats, Friulians, and Venetian-Italians. Jill Benderly and Evan Kraft have 
produced a book on the recent history of Slovenia (since 1989), but the book's 
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background coverage on the rise of Slovene ethnic and national consciousness is 
limited to a short translation of an article by Slovene histori~ Janka Prunk. Other 
works on Slovenia are mostly in the Slovene language or in Serbo-Croatian. 
English language studies on Croatian and Friulian historical development are rare or 
non-existent; however, there are German and Italian sources available. On the other 
hand, there is a rich supply of material on the Venetian-Italians of Venezia-Giulia in 
the Italian language. Still, there is no single, definitive English language study of 
Venezia-Giulia and its peoples since the rise of nationalism in the early nineteenth 
century. 
This thesis is a multifaceted study of Venezia-Giulia focusing on the ethnic, 
cultural, political and social attributes of its peoples and the historical events which 
led to the rise of ethnic and national consciousness within each ethnic group. The 
author has extracted materials relating to the subject from major secondary works 
on Austri~ Italian and South Slav history and has synthesized them into a single 
English language history of Venezia-Giulia, since 1815. He discusses the historical 
development of four peoples who reside in Venezia-Giulia within the context of 
external cultural and political influence. Further, the author uses the theoretical 
writings of several contemporary scholars to explain the nation building process of 
ethnic groups. 
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Each ethnic group in Venezia-Giulia followed a different development path. 
The Friulians never reached a national consciousness and remained a people first 
under the Austrians, then as members of the Italian nation-state. The 
Venetian-Italians of Venezia-Giulia did not follow the rapid nation-building process 
that the Italians on the rest of the peninsula experienced, but they aspired to join in 
union with Italy. Finally, after fifty years of turmoil, portions of Venezia-Giulia 
were fully absorbed within the Italian state in 1954. The Croats and Slovenes 
progressed through an intermediate stage of national development through 
incorporation into the South Slav or Yugoslav state after World War I. Both the 
Croata and Slovenes achieved nationhood in 1991. 
The author has used the following orthographic conventions. Italian words 
have accent marks, German words with umlaut have conventional English spelling 
(without the ae, ue, oe ), and Slavic accent marks have been ignored. For the most 
part the letter 'c' at the end of a word is pronounced 'ch', but it is pronounced as 
'tz' at the beginning or in the middle of a word. The letter's' at the beginning of a 
word is pronounced frequently as 'sh'. The letter 'z' in the middle of a word is 
pronounced 'je', as the French 'j'. Except as noted in bibliographic references, 
translations are by the author. 
x 
NOTES 
1 Ezio Belluno, "La Rocca di Monfalcone", Mario Roberti (Ed) Studi Monfalconese e Duinati. (Udine: 
Arti Grafiche Friulane, 1976), 114. 
2 The Carso (in Italian, Kras in Slovene or Karst in German) is named after the type of limestone which 
covers the hinterland of the foot hills which rise from the river plains of the west and the marshes of the 
south to the heights of the Julian Alps. The name is derived from an ancient Celt word kars meaning rock. 
3 The Slovene name is Julijske krajine (Julian March). 
4 Irredentism is defined as a policy directed toward the incorporation of historically or ethnically related 
territory into a political state. (Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary. 1983). Italia irredenta 
(unredeemed Italy) was the rallying call to irredentist claims. 
5 These recent studies include dissertations by Eric Terzuolo (Relations between the Italian and Yugoslav 
Communist Parties), Frank Verner (Italian occupation ofYugoslaVia), Lucien Karchmar (Yugoslav 
Resistance), Roberto Rabel (Expansion of the Cold War aspects) and Glenda Sluga (Feminist aspects of 
the Trieste conflict). 
6 Janko Pronk, "Sovenski narodni vzon" (Slovene national ascent), Narodna politika 1768-1992. 
(Ljubiana: Drzavna zalozba Slovnije, 1992), Jill Benderly and Evan Kraft (Eds.) Independent Slovenia: 
Origins. Movements. Pros.pects. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994) 1-23. 
7 There are many good surveys of Italy (Mack-Smith and Clark), the Balkans and East Europe (Jelavich, 
Singleton, Dedijer, Kann and Zed.nick), Austria-Hungary (Kohn) and the rise of nationalism (Hobsba~ 
Niederhauser, and Anthony Smith). These works, however, do not focus in detail on Venezia-Giulia in 
all its complexities, nationalism, irredentism, politics, social and economic development and demographic 
shifts over a period of two centuries. · 
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CHAPTER 1 
BEFORE NATIONALISM: 
THE REGION AND ITS EARLY HISTORY 
If one uses the City of Trieste (Trst) as a focal point (Map 1) and draws an arc 
from Venice, northward to the Carnian Alps (Karnishe Alpe ), then eastward through the 
city of Tarvisio, which sits on the present Austrian-Italian border, then around the Julian 
Alps (Julijske Alpe), reaching the Sava River plain west ofLubiana (Ljubljana), then 
southward to the Istrian peninsula to the cities of Fiume (Rijeka) and Pola (Pula), one can 
get a grasp of the regions of Venezia-Giulia (Julijska Krajina), Friuli, western Slovenia and 
Istria (Slovenska Primorska). 1 Flowing down from mountain sources are the Piave and 
Tagliamento Rivers which run through the fertile Friulian plains.2 Another river, the 
Isonzo (Soca), flows southward into the Italian shores of the Adriatic; however, although 
the mouth of the river is in Italy, the source lies in the Republic of Slovenia. Running 
parallel to the Isonzo are hills of readily water-soluble limestone. Hence the surface rocks 
are honeycombed with hollows and caves (foibe). There is little surface soil, but where 
there is soil, the abundant rainfall of the area develops a cover of grass and pine forest. 3 
This rocky area is called the Carso (Kras, Karst), and it sweeps eastward from the Julian 
foothills to the Sava river valley and south through Istria and the Dalmatian coast. In the 
mountainous north, lie zinc, copper and lead deposits. 
The geographical position of the Carso has proved unfortunate for the peoples 
who have inhabited the land, for a multitude of raiding and invading peoples marched 
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along this main corridor from central Europe and from the Balkans across the Carso. 
Venezia-Giulia links the Italian plain of the Po Valley with the Danubian basin. The 
Peartree Pass (Hrusica), north of Zagreb, permits traffic from the Danube to move along 
the Sava to the west, and with connection of the Sava and Drava river valleys, the pass 
can also receive traffic from the east through the Orsova Gate.4 At Trieste and Gorizia lie 
two narrow passages to Italy though the Julian Alps and the Carso. The Romans 
recognized the strategic value of this area, and they built defenses aside the road from 
Aquileia to the east in the second century.5 Yet the defenses did not stop the invading 
forces from the north and from the east. 
Although evidence of Neolithic culture indicates the presence of the earliest 
inhabitants of the territory, Bronze Age artifacts reveal at least three identifiable 
cultures--Pannonian, in the east, Enetian, in the west, and lllyrian in the south. 6 The 
remains of the Castellieri or stone forts show that these peoples needed stone fortifications 
for protection against marauders. 7 By 400 BC, Celtic tribes migrated into the area. 8 One 
of the tribes was called the Cami which settled in the northern mountains, now called the 
Camian Alps, and over time, drifted southward along the Carso.9 Along the Adriatic coast 
and in the Veneto plain, the Veneti tribe lived. 10 
The world of the early tribes inhabiting the area underwent transformation with the 
expansion of the Roman Empire. The Veneti were easily incorporated into the empire, 
but Celts, the Cisalpine Gauls, offered resistance. The Illyrians also resisted the Romans 
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and interfered with their aspirations in the Balkans, but superior Roman power suppressed 
both of these ancient tribes. As a result of the Roman conquests, all of present-day 
Venezia-Giulia, Friuli, Slovenia and !stria acquired Roman administration and Roman 
civilization under the provinces ofRhaetia, Noricum, Pannonia Superior, and Illyicum 
(Map 2). 11 
Venezia-Giulia and Friuli 
Roman culture was fully absorbed by the Veneti. By 300 BC, they had already 
settled into farming the river plains and entered commercial trade in the newly created 
towns and cities of Grado, Aquileia and Tergeste (Trieste). Of these, Aquileia became the 
major center for the spread of Roman influence to the north and east with its commercial 
and religious arteries. The city maintained contacts with the Celts in Rhaetia who 
absorbed Romanization to produce a unique linguistic and ethnic group, the Fruilians. 
Their spoken language was quite distinct from other Italic dialects, being a mix of Lati~ 
Greek (Byzantine), Celt and Gothic. 12 
In the sixth century, after enduring four centuries of invasions of Goths and Huns, 
Veneto and Rhaetia experienced the coming of the Lombards. When the Lombard 
chieftain, Albo~ arrived near Cividale, (Map 3) he did not meet an effective opposing 
Byzantine force, but he was still confronted with attacks by the Avars from the east. 
Using the ruins of the imperial cities and towns, he constructed defenses and formed an 
occupation administratio~ creating the duchy ofFriuli. Thus the march (frontier) of 
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Friuli became separated from the rest of Veneta and nourished the development of a 
distinct culture and language. 
As the Lombards moved out of the area into the Po River valley and to the 
province that is named for them (Lombardy), the Byzantines attempted to reestablish 
their influence and to counter the continued attacks by the Avars, but the power vacuum 
was later filled by the coming of a new set of overlords, the Franks. This new subjection 
of a people was reflected in the writings of the nineteenth century Italian nationalist, 
Alessandro Manzoni (author of I Promessi Sposi [The Betrothed]): 
Old enemies lose to new lords, 
Yet the people are still collared 
By one or the other. 13 
The Duchy ofFriuli entered the confines of the Holy Roman Empire under Otto I 
in the tenth century, and the Germans greatly influenced the cultural and political 
characteristics of the people. During the conflict between the Papacy and the Empire in 
the twelfth century, the Friulian nobility, who were German, strongly supported the 
Ghibellini (Imperial) position. 14 A new element arose with the growth of the Venetian 
Republic from 1100 onward. The Adriatic became the Venetian Sea. Venice developed 
the coast-lands and in an effort to secure the hinterlands, attempted to establish alliances 
with the nobility of the towns of Gorizia and Udine. With Gorizia, the Venetians were 
successful, but with Udine, the northern Friulians remained loyal to the Holy Roman 
Empire. As a result of the tensions between the two powers, a war broke out in the early 
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fifteenth century. Such was the history of the peoples of this area; they were trapped 
between the wills of greater powers. 
For twenty-five years the Venetians occupied Friuli and portions of Slovene 
speaking lands along the Julian Alps and along the north-eastern Adriatic coast. In 1509, 
the Habsburgs defeated the Venetians at Agnadello, resulting in another split of Friuli, 
with Gorizia in the east under the Habsburgs and with Pordenone in the west under the 
Venetians.1.s (Map 3). The line dividing the two powers remained the same from that point 
of time until the nineteenth century. The Venetian-Imperial conflict also affected the 
organization of the Church. The Patriarchies of Aquileia and Grado lost their control of 
the east to a new diocese established in Lubiana (Laibach) and of the north in Friuli to the 
diocese of Salzburg. 16 
Slovenia 
The Gothic and Hun invasions of the fourth, fifth and sixth centuries displaced the 
Celt inhabitants in Cisapline Gaul. As the invaders moved on to other areas, the terrain of 
present day Slovenia was vacated, soon to be filled by a Slavic people. The Slavs were 
originally fanning tribes speaking another Inda-European tongue who dwelled in the 
present-day Ukraine, but who migrated westward, under pressure of the Avars. There are 
accounts of periodic raids by the Slavs as confederates of the A vars in the Balkans in the 
sixth century. In the seventh century, as the Magyars entered the Hungarian plain and as 
the Germans (Franks and Bavarians) started their Drang nach Ostern. the Southern Slavs 
became divided from their western cousins, the Czechs and Slovaks. The Slovenes were 
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the first southern Slav people to migrate into Venezia-Giulia in the early seventh century. 
(Map 4). Since their tribe was originally close to the Czech tribes, the Slovenes at that 
time spoke a language similar to that of the Czechs. The other southern Slavs--Serbs, 
Croats, Bulgars--settled in other areas of the Balkans and became separated from each 
other, both physically and culturally, partly because of geographical obstacles and partly 
because of foreign occupations. 17 
In the early years (623-658), the Bohemians (Czechs and Slovaks) and Slovenes 
united briefly under a chieftain, Samo, to defend themselves from the Avars and the 
Franks, who were trying to push their boundaries westward and eastward, respectively. 13 
(Map 5). A century later, the Slovene people fought the Bavarian and Friulian dukes, yet 
they too submitted to the Franks in the year 748. The Frankish king christianized the 
Slovenes and incorporated them, along with the Friulian people into the Holy Roman 
Empire. 
Under Emperor Otto I, the Franks governed both Friuli and Slovenia. To protect 
against the Magyar raids, Otto created three marches--Carinthia, Carniola and Kustenland. 
In the thirteenth century, the Bohemian king, Ottokar, formed an alliance to break away 
from the Holy Roman Empire a second time, but this rebellion was crushed at the battle at 
Marchfeld by Rudolf of Habsburg in 1278. (Map 6). The Habsburgs consolidated their 
acquisition of lands by annexing Carinthia, Carniola, Styria, Trieste and Istria in the 
fourteenth century. From then on, until the twentieth century the Slovenes were 
dependents of the Habsburgs. 19 
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While the Habsburgs controlled the western Balkans, they were threatened in 
present day Serbia and Croatia by the Ottoman conquests of the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries. The Turks were rolled back by 1699 to a line that traversed the Sava and the 
Danube, a line which held for five hundred years. (Map 7). This line was the famous 
Military Frontier (Vojnisk Kraj). The military border marches were organized by the 
Habsburgs, commanded by Germans, manned chiefly by Serb soldiers and financed by the 
estates of the Slovene crown lands. 20 The military frontier in the southern areas of 
present-day Croatia were protected by Croat soldiers. 
Although closely related ethnically to the Slovenes, the Serbs and Croats had 
different histories, but unlike the Slovenes, the Serbs and Croats had at one time or 
another controlled their own kingdom and had a unique history. The Serbs met the 
challenges of the Balkans and the Turks directly, while the Croats faced continued conflict 
with their northern neighbors, the Hungarians. The Hungarians gained the throne of 
Croatia in 1102; however, Istria (the peninsula opposite Venice), settled by Byzantine, 
Slovene and Croat peoples, remained under the control of the developing Venetian 
Republic. 21 
The levies and taxes collected to finance the defenses of the Military Frontier cost 
the Slovene peasants dearly. Under the feudal society serfs were able to retain land 
holdings for their own subsistence. Peasant land holdings, however, became smaller, and 
many peasants were no longer able to eke a livelihood from their reduced circumstances. 
As a result, a peasant revolt flared up in 1515 in all of Carinthia, but the lack of organized 
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leadership of the rebellion caused a quick suppression by the nobility. Another uprising 
occurred in 1635, and it also failed. The Croat peasants also suffered economic privations 
at the hands of their nobility, but they did not rebel. 22 
. The Habsburgs in the seventeenth century further divided the territory inhabited by 
the Slovenes and Friulians into six administrative areas, all of which formed parts of 
Austria. These were Styria (Steiermark), Carniola (Krain), Carinthia (Karnten), Trieste, 
Gorizia (Gorica)-Gradisca and !stria. (Map 8). With Habsburg rule came Germanization. 
German barons acquired lands and German peasants farmed them, German artisans and 
merchants moved into Friulian and Slovene towns and the German Habsburgs who 
controlled the dioceses appointed German bishops. 23 
The Germanization encouraged talented young scholars to attend German schools. 24 
One such man was Primoz Trubar, who experienced the Reformation in the early 
sixteenth century and the impact of Martin Luther's translation of the Bible into the 
vernacular German. Trubar made the first translation of the New Testament into Slovene, 
and he supported the development of a Slovene grammar. The works of Trubar and his 
collaborators circulated widely and influenced many educated Croats and Serbs who 
began to appreciate their own languages.'.Zj The Counter-Reformation actions of the 
Jesuits, however, quickly suppressed the use of written vernacular. It was not until the 
Enlightenment of the late eighteenth century that linguistic and ethnic consciousness arose 
again. 
9 
During the seventeenth century the towns in Slovenia were predominantly Slovene, 
except coastal Venetian towns. The nobility was largely German and to a lesser extent, 
Italian, but the Counter Reformation weakened German influence in the area, while Italian 
influence strengthened with the arrival of Italian merchants, artisans, doctors and lawyers. 
In 1631 the Bishop ofLubiana (Laibach) recorded that while the common people spoke 
Slovene, the public authorities used German, and the educated spoke mostly Italian. 26 
10 
NOTES 
1 For the purposes of uniformity, the Italian name will be used in this paper. The Slovene or German 
name will be indicated when the name is first introduced, for example, Fiume (Rijeka). 
2 The highest peak in the area is Veliki Triglav at 2864 meters (9,400 feet). (Paul Blanchard., Blue Guide 
to Yugoslavia [New York: W.W. Norton, 1984], 11). 
3 Griffith Taylor, "The Geographical Scene", Robert Kerner, (Ed) Yugoslavia (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1949), 5. 
4 Ibid 8. 
5 Aquileia was the fourth largest city in Italy during the first five centuries of the Christian era. It was 
sacked by the Huns, but it remained influential until the ninth century. Its remains are on the northern 
Adriatic, between Venice and Trieste. 
6 The Pannonian culture remained survived until the arrival of the Lombards (560 AD). The Enetian 
culture in what is now northern Italy was absorbed by Veneti (an early Italic tribe which occupied the area 
around 1000 BC. (Loredana Capuis, I Veneti: societa e cultura di un popolo dell' Italia preromana 
(Milano: Longanesi & C. 1993 ), 9) The Illyrian culture existed through the reign of one of its sons, 
Dioclecian. 
7 Vladimir Dedijer, History of Yugoslavia (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1974, 7. 
8 Stephen Clissold (Ed) History of Yugoslavia: From Early Times to 1966, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1966), 208. 
9 Livy spoke about the Cami as Gauls. The origins of the Cami are obscure, but there is evidence that they 
were Celts who migrated from Asia Minor about 1000 BC. 
10 See note 6, above. 
11 Dedijer, History ofYugoslavia 9. 
12 Giuseppe Francesca to, Storia. lingua e societa' in Friuli. (Udine: Casamassima, 1977), 113. As 
Slovenes and Bavarians settled into the area, the language developed even further away from the Italic, yet 
its structure and grammar follow the Italian idiom. Friulian is a Rhaetic-Roman language, as is ladino. a 
language spoken in the Carnian Alps today. (Corey Kummer, "Italy's Coziest Comer", Atlantic, [April 
1993], 116) The word Friuli is a corruption of Foro Iulia. the Roman provincial see, now named Cividale. 
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NOTES 
13 Ibid, 79. "II forte se mesce col vinto nemico 
14 Ibid. 99. 
1 ~ Ibid, 135. 
col nuovo signore remane l'antico: 
l'un popolo e l'altro sul collo vista" 
16 In the early church the patriarch was a bishop next in rank to the Pope, with a metropolitan jurisdiction 
(Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionarv). The Patriarchy of Aquilea controlled most of 
Venezia-Giulia and the southern half of Carniola (the northern half was controlled by the Bishop of 
Salzburg). 
17 Fred Singleton, A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), 1 415. 
18 Clissold, A Short History of Yugoslavia. 12. 
19 Ibid. 13-15. 
20 Dedijer, History of Yugoslavia. 141-147. 
21 The Hungarian military frequently came to Croat lands when provoked by Venice's taking possession 
of coastal towns in Dalmatia and Istria. Under Hungarian rule, the old Byzantine Dalmatia collapsed 
entirely. Venice began to fill the vacuum in its effort to control its Mar Nostrum. the Adriatic. Italian 
merchants and artisans occupied the towns and cities of not only Dalmatia, Istria, but also its own port of 
Trieste. Slovenes and Croats occupied the hinterland, and to a small extent the coastal cities, but for the 
most part, the ports were under Venetian control. (Dedijer, History of Yugoslavia. 58.) 
22 Ibid. 162. 
23 Singleton, A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples. 51. 
24 During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the northern part of Slovenia and Friuli had assimilated 
German colonists. 
~Singleton, A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples, 52. 
26 Robert A. Kann and David V Zdenek, The Peoples of the Eastern Habsburg Lands. 1526-1918. 
Seattle: (University of Washington Press, 1989), 123. 
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CHAPTER2 
THE E11ERGENCE AND DEVELOP11ENT OF ITALIAN AND SOUTH SLAV 
ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM 
The Habsburg provinces of Carinthia, Carniola, Gorizia, Istria, Styria and 
Trieste benefited from the reforms introduced by Maria Theresa and Joseph II in the late 
eighteenth century. The influential French Physiocrats argued that only a prosperous, 
tax-paying peasantry could finance the growing requirements for the defense of the realm. 1 
For that reason, the peasant needed to be free from the heavy feudal duties imposed on 
him by the local nobility, so that the peasant could spend more time on cultivation of his 
own crops and be able to pay taxes directly to the crown. 
One reform was the institution of local provincial governments, which replaced the 
clientele of the nobility with a body of competent civil servants. 2 As sue~ the German 
nobility was shorn of its earlier representation in the Diet (Parliament) and its heavy 
control of the peasants. A second reform was the reduction of compulsory peasant labor 
to two days a week. Although setfdom was not abolished, direct taxation of the peasantry 
to support the estates was diminished while guaranteed land tenure for peasants on private 
estates was instituted. A third important reform was the introduction of the vernacular in 
the elementary schools and the use of vernacular in publications.3 The latter reform 
dealing with education provided the basis for an increasingly literate population in 
Venezia-Giulia and provided an absolute precondition for the growth of ethnic and 
national identity. 
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The eighteenth century also furnished the philosophical basis for nationalism. The 
flowering of intellectual support for rationalism in government occurred in the 
Enlightenment. John Locke, and Thomas Hobbes inspired their readers to create a 
rational state. Montesquieu attempted to identify and analyze national characteristics, and 
David Hume assumed that each nation had a peculiar set of manners explained by climate 
or economic-political features. 4 Rousseau anticipated Georg Hegel in expressing that a 
nation was founded on a national spirit. Nations were conceived from both reason and 
from sentimentality. While the eighteenth century provided the philosophical basis for 
nationalism, the nineteenth century brought it to fruition. 
The French Revolution and the conquests of Napoleon jolted the framework of 
European civilization. When the Venetian Republic collapsed in 1808 and Bonaparte 
conquered Italy one year later, Napoleon not only created the Kingdom ofltaly, he also 
recreated a province called "Illyria". This new province took the ancient Roman 
provincial name and incorporated the old Habsburg provinces of Carniola, Carinthia, 
Croatia and !stria and the Venetian province of Dalmatia into a single French province. 
The French administration permitted the local educated elite to participate in government 
and encouraged the use of the local languages (Italian, Slovene and Croatian) in the 
secondary schools and in public affairs. 5 The experience, though short in duration 
( 1809-1813 ), energized Italian and South Slav intellectuals to uncover their ethnic 
uniqueness and national spirit by studying language, history and folklore. 6 The Romantic 
movement in the early nineteenth century brought Europe a golden age of lexicographers, 
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grammarians, philologists of the vernacular as well as writers, poets, dramatists, and folk 
musicians who explored their newly found ethnicity. 
There are many ways of defining ethnicity. The more traditional method is to 
describe ethnicity by some distinguishing cultural feature that clearly separates one group 
from another-be it language, religion, race or a combination of these features. The 
anthropologist, George D. De Vos, defines ethnicity as a sense of ethnic identity which 
consists of "subjective, symbolic or emblematic use by a group of people---of any aspect 
of culture, in order to differentiate themselves from other groups. "7 De Vos adds folk 
tradition and practices, historical continuity and common ancestry or place of origin as 
attributes which bring about a sense of community. Another contemporary scholar, 
Anthony D. Smith states that an ethnic community is a means by which a people express 
collective experiences. These experiences include a common myth of descent, a shared 
history, a distinctive shared culture and an association with a specific territory. These 
attributes become formalized in symbolic rites and myths and ultimately pass into legal 
codes and institutions. The symbolism of shared history or experiences is a strong bond. 8 
De Vos comments that "ethnicity is like religion, people seem to need it. ''9 
More often than not, the ethnic demands of the nineteenth century centered 
initially around a single central symbol. Io Of those objective features most commonly used 
in defining ethnicity, language is most often cited as a major distinguishing attribute, but 
it is often only a symbol of identity of belonging to a group with its traditions and myths. 
Benedict Anderson, an anthropologist, argues that language and symbols are the tools to 
reinforce ethnic identity. II He describes language as a symbol of a sense of community. 
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Anderson calls the nation an "imagined community''. It is imagined because the word 
community refers to daily, personal contact of members of the group, hardly possible even 
in the smallest state,' yet each member shares a deep horizontal comradeship, expressed 
through language. Ernest Gellner, a contemporary political scientist, goes further and 
rules that this sense of community, ethnic consciousness, invents nations where they do 
not exist. 
'The Czech historian Miroslav Hroch defines three phases in the development of 
nationalism in nineteenth-century Europe. The initial phase was characterized by the 
presence of an active intelligentsia involved in the discovery of ethnic history, culture and 
language. The second phase was the awakening of national consciousness among the 
educated bourgeoisie and civil servants, and the final phase was the mobilization of the 
masses. 12 
The intelligentsia, especially the academics, lawyers and journalists, who were 
proficient in persuasion with the use of the vernacular helped to promote ethnic 
identity-the first phase.13 These men could be called "Awakeners" 14 The 
impact of the printing press, the opening of universities and the transfonnation of the 
vernacular into a literary language influenced the stratum between the upper middle class 
and the masses-school teachers, parish priests and local officials who extended the sense 
of nationalism and ethnic pride in the towns and villages-the second phase. 15 With 
growing urbanization, literacy and a popular press, mobilization of the masses could 
occur-the third phase. 
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South Slav Ethnic Consciousness 
In Slovenia, the first national poet, France Preseren, wrote lyrical poetry in both 
the German and the Slovene language. Preseren was an "Awakener''. His poetry sang of 
the land and people in a lyrical manner. Although his primary audience was the educated 
bilingual intelligentsia of his native Slovenia, peasants recited passages of his poetry.16 
Preseren and his colleague, Matija Cop, used the Slovene language in their writings, rather 
than using the related Croat language, that the Croat linguist Ljudevit Gaj proposed. 17 
The Slovene language was called kajkavian with its own syntax, orthographic accent 
markings and vocabulary. Slovene was preserved as a distinct national tongue different 
from the Serbo-Croatian stokavian language by the efforts of the major Slovene linguist 
and philologist, Bartholmaeus Kopitar, who developed the Slovene grammar in the late 
eighteenth century. The language became a literary and popular written language with the 
poetry of Preseren with its use in the press. By 1800, a Slovene manufacturer, Baron Z. 
Zais, published a Slovene language newspaper, Lublanske Novize (News ofLubiana). 18 
Benedict Anderson points out that once a language reaches a stage where it is profitable 
to print newspapers, ''Print capitalism permits rapid mobilization of ethnic 
consciousness. " 19 
Another Awakener of South Slavic ethnic awareness was not a poet, but a man of 
both letters and of the Church. Bishop Jo sip Juraj Strossmayer of Djakovo was a Croat 
who saw the past history of the South Slavs (Catholic Croats and Slovenes and Orthodox 
Serbs) as the key to a unified nation.20 As an influential cleric and writer, he encouraged 
the use of the vernacular in secondary schools and in the press. 21 By so doing, 
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Strossmayer was able to re-ignite the fervor of nationalism stirred during the brief 
existence of Napoleon's province of Illyria. 22 He was realistic enough to recognize that 
the South Slavs could not stand alone as a separate nation. His vision was of a South 
Slav nation within the Habsburg Empire. 
Although Strossmayer stimulated South Slav ethnic and national consciousness, his 
new movement gained few Slovene followers as they saw their idiom and history were 
distinct. Slovene ethnic consciousness made slow but steady progress in the first half of 
the nineteenth century. The education reforms instituted at the beginning of the century 
began to take effect. In 1809 one in seven Slovene children received an elementary 
education in his native tongue. By 184 7, one in three received grammar school education 
taught in Slovene. In the same period the number of secondary schools increased from 
three to ten. While literacy in the vernacular increased ethnic consciousness, the Slovene 
national movement suffered one major weakness--the difficulty in enlisting the rising 
middle class to use the vernacular in commerce and in government, for the bourgeoisie 
preferred German or Italian for public use. 23 
The Revolutions of 1848-1849 helped change this attitude. The news of the March 
Revolution in 1848 in Vienna led the Slovene peasants to express their social discontent 
rather than demanding national or political change. They were primarily interested in 
ending the vestiges of the feudal system. 24 Members of the Slovene intelligentsia and 
middle class saw the need for reform. In Vienna, they organized the Slovenija Society for 
the purpose of creating a United Slovenia into a semi-autonomous nation with its own 
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. Diet as part of the Habsburg Empire, but this national movement failed because of 
inadequate leadership. The Slovenija Society was successful, however, during the 
revolution, in supporting state elementary schooling reform, which further strengthened 
earlier efforts for universal education and the continued use of the mother tongue as a 
teaching language. 
The Revolutions of 1848 -1849 failed to overturn the old order, yet the revolutions 
achieved one major reform, the abolition of serfdom. The emancipation helped bridge the 
gap between the peasant and the emerging middle class. Other reforms were initiated, 
including the official use of the Slovene language in 1851, but the conservative backlash 
prevented implementation of them and the Austrian regime returned to political centralism 
with an entire system resting on German civil servants.~ The chancellor, Alexander Bach, 
subjected both the Friulians and Slovenes to a ruthless policy of Germanization.26 The 
reforms in the use of language legislated by the Reichsrat in 1848 were ignored, the 
official gazette was no longer published in the vernacular, and most Slovene periodicals, 
launched in 1848, disappeared. Gains in elementary education persisted, but the 
secondary schools again became thoroughly German.27 By 1867, however, with 
parliamentary reforms, the Slovenes won a majority in the provincial diet and made 
progress in the use of their language in representative state bodies, offices, 
courts and secondary schools. The Elementary School Act of 1869 practically established 
universal education and radically increased literacy.28 By 1900 over ninety per cent of the 
population was literate, making Slovenia the most advanced South Slav "nation". 29 
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Textbooks, catechisms, and newspapers in the national language appeared early in 
the century and grew in significant numbers in the later part of the nineteenth century, thus 
facilitating the mobilization of the masses. Eric Hobsbawm states that nationalism 
essentially required control or at least the official recognition for the national language. 
Hence, the moment when textbooks or newspapers in the national language were first 
written or that language was used for some official purpose, a crucial step was taken in the 
evolution toward a nation-state. 30 National consciousness tended to become more of a 
political issue as cadres dedicated to the national idea emerged who published journals 
and other literature, organized national societies and established educational and cultural 
institutions (e.g. Sokols, gymnastic clubs). 31 Near the end of the century, literacy 
increased significantly, and the masses became more aware of their ethnicity through the 
popular press. By then, Slovene became the obligatory language in judicial proceedings, if 
a party knew no other language. 32 
The public did not become nationalist solely from sentiment, but also from 
potential social-economic advantages. 33 Autonomy and self-sufficiency meant jobs, more 
material items, including some luxuries, and social mobility. The peasants and lower 
clergy of Eastern Europe accepted nationalism when they became conscious of foreign 
social and economic domination. 34 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, Slovenes underwent a gradual 
transition from a rural to an industrial society. Although most Slovenes still lived in rural 
areas and worked the land, after the abolition of serfdom they were legally free to leave 
the countryside. With freedom and population growth came economic insecurity. Local 
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parish priests and groups of peasants began to form rural cooperatives. Other peasants 
began to migrate to urban centers in search of jobs. In major towns and cities, most 
Slovenes became factory workers or miners, while a few became entrepreneurs, bankers 
and government employees. The effects of industrialization reflected greater urbanization. 
While the overall population of Slovenia grew by twenty percent from 1857 to 1910, the 
number of people living in rural areas declined by thirty percent. A number of important 
industrial centers developed, including multinational Trieste, Gorizia and Villach. In the 
city of Trieste, due to the needs of industrial manpower, the number of Slovenes increased 
steadily. In 1910, twenty-five percent of the population was Slovene. (Table I, below). 
In contrast, the Italians of the Veneta Region moved into the cities of Dalmatia 
and !stria. In these areas, the whole of the middle class was Italian. The ports of Pola, 
Fiume and Zara (Zadar) were Italian islands in a Slav sea. (Map 9). In 1846 there were 
60,000 Italians among 228,000 Slavs, but by 1910, there were 140,000 Italians among 
3 17,000 Slavs in !stria. The following table provides the official census figures of key 
industrial cities of Venezia-Giulia:35 
Trieste 
Gorizia 
1880 
1910 
1880 
1910 
Table I 
German Italian Slovene Croat Other 
5,000 89,000 
12,000 119,000 
2,100 
3,200 
13,000 
14,800 
26,000 
59,000 
3,400 
10,800 
2,500 
3,000 30,000 
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Census figures must be used with caution. Since the census tables used by the 
Habsburgs listed different ethnic groups only for Austrian subjects, many citizens of Italy 
(15,000) living in Venezia-Giulia were tabulated simply as "Others". 36 In addition, 
numerous ethnic Slovenes and Croats were classified as Italian, since some Slavs who 
migrated to the Italian-dominated cities rejected their mother tongue as a language of 
peasants, and began to speak Italian. To be an Italian--a city-dweller--brought social 
prestige and economic advantages. Those who had married Italians or wished for greater 
opportunities simply proclaimed themselves Italians. In the same manner, Slovenes living 
in cities dominated by Germans, such as Graz or Klagenfurt, chose to assimilate in order 
to move up the social ladder. As literate Slovenes migrated to the cities and entered 
commerce and industry, they found the cities dominated by ''foreign" ethnic groups 
(Germans and Italians). The economic and social elite demanded the imposition of one 
language of instruction, a different culture and a ''foreign" nationality. The Slovenes 
were forced to choose assimilation or inferior status of an immigrant. Many Slovene 
industrial workers sought a solution through unionization and socialism. 
Raymond Pearson, an East European historian, argues that urbanization, the 
leading demographic by-product of industrialization, also favored the development of 
nationalism. As towns and cities began to spring up, e.g. Zagreb, Lubiana and Trieste, the 
fortunes of individual nationalities became largely contingent upon possession of an urban 
base. Towns supplied a meeting place for the educated cadres (intelligentsia and middle 
class) who could mobilize the urban proletariat. Only a city could constitute that mass 
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concentration of forces for the bastion of national opportunity. 37 The urban populations of 
Trieste and Gorizia had grown to provide such a base. 
Italian Nationalism 
The peoples ofFriuli experienced many of the official pressures that the Slovenes 
endured under the Habsburgs. Yet, Friuli did not produce Awakeners for national 
consciousness. Though Friulian intellectuals were infatuated with local customs, historical 
traditions and the spoken and written vernacular, they did not pursue it as an official 
language. The vernacular taught in the schools was not Friulian, but Italian or German. 
The Habsburgs considered Friulian and the related Ladino (Rhaetic-Roman) as regional 
dialects. In the northern areas ofFriuli both German and Friulian were spoken, and in the 
southern areas both Italian and Friulian were used as the idioms, but the languages taught 
in schools were German and Italian. Consequently, those living in the northern region 
identified with German culture, while those living in the southern region identified with 
Italian culture. In contrast with the Slovenes, who eventually won the official use of the 
vernacular, the Friulians did not have a popular daily press in their own language nor did 
they demand official use of their language. Consequently the Fruilians did not develop a 
national feeling. 
In the Italian peninsula the experience of Bonapartism sparked the imagination of 
educated Italians. Italy, where clerical and foreign domination had demoralized the 
national spirit for more than a thousand years, remained a patchwork of feudal duchies 
and states. Still, the distant calls for Italian nationalism from Dante to Machievelli lay 
buried in the national literature. Under Napoleon, Austria was banished from Lombardy 
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and Venetia, Spain from Naples and a "Kingdom of Italy" was proclaimed. Although the 
Restoration after 1815 brought back the Habsburgs and Bourbons, it could not cancel the 
effects of the French Revolution. Napoleon's armies were rolled back, but his granting of 
local autonomy from the tyranny of foreigners was remembered. Despite the repression 
following the Restoration, the ground was fertile for secret orders, like the Carbonari, to 
form and spread the ideas of independence from foreign domination. 38 
Another nationalist writer, by the name of Guiseppe Mazzini, became an Italian 
Awakener, not only by the use of words, but also by action.39 He envisioned Italy as one, 
indivisible and free nation, with Rome as her capital. 
"Come with me, and I will show you where beats the heart ofltaly. 
Bow the knee and worship. Yonder beats the heart ofltaly, yonder 
eternally majestic, is Rome." 
The First Rome of the Caesars, according to Mazzini, carried to the world the idea 
of right, of justice, the source of liberty. The Second Rome, governed by the great 
Popes, made the secular law sacred and superimposed the idea of duty. The Third Rome, 
the Rome of the Italian People, had a mission to "instruct the free and equal peoples of the 
nations in the Association of Unity and Duty". 40 Thus, Mazzini perpetuated a modem 
myth of a Third Rome with a clearly defined Italy as the savior of the world. Italy was 
embraced by the mountains and by mare nostro. He saw nations divided from one another 
by natu~al frontiers, traced by God in the rivers, mountains and seas. Historically Italy had 
always been a civilizing influence among nations, and Rome had been the center of 
civilization. 41 
Building upon the Roman-Italian mythology, Mazzini formed the republican 
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society of Young Italy, which assumed the moral leadership of the Italian movement. 
Aspirations for a liberal state ran high in the 1840' s, for the young King Charles Albert of 
Savoy, King of Sardinia, invoked the names of Napoleon and Washington in his appeals 
for unity.42 Yet those hopes were soon dashed as Charles Albert lashed out against Young 
Italy as atheists and as conspirators. Mazzini was forced into exile, first in Switzerland, 
then in England. His idea of Young Italy encouraged others, and nationalist ideas and 
actions burst the bounds of Klemens van Metternich's Europe with the Revolutions of 
1848-1849. 
One of the greatest challenges to the integrity of the Austrian Monarchy in 1848 
came from northern Italy. Revolutions broke out in Milan and Venice, and Marshal 
Joseph Radetzky' s forces were driven out of both cities. By summer of 1848, both 
Lombardy and Venetia had voted to become part of an Italian kingdom under the House 
of Savoy, but the Austrian marshal, Count Radetzky succeeded in retaking Milan, and in 
the following year, he defeated Charles Albert at Novara in the Piedmont. Venice 
capitulated, and the leaders of an abortive Mazzinian uprising went into exile.43 While 
these revolutions generally failed to win their objectives, they destroyed the old regime 
that Metternich, the venerable Austrian Prime Minister, strove to maintain.44 The decisive 
confrontation was not between old regimes and the united forces of progress, but between 
order and social revolution. Thus the Revolutions of 1848-1849 surged and broke like a 
great wave, leaving little behind except myth and promise. 45 
All was not lost after 1848. Mazzini's words were read and the spirit of the 
risorgimento was about to stir. The traditions and myths that Mazzini capitalized upon 
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provided a mold for nation-building, for they offered a sense of belonging. The 
nation-state would establish autonomy and unity, and myth would reinforce the bonds of 
unity. To some political philosophers, like Ernest Renan and Heinrich von Treitschke, the 
nation was a Hegelian organism with a soul. 46 The myths were based on metaphysical, 
physical, and cultural aspects. The metaphysical aspect made the nation a part of God's 
divine plan--Providence.47 Treitschke, influenced by Montesquieu's emphasis on the 
physical environment's impact on race and culture, led him to apply Social Darwinism on 
national scale. In the struggle for existence in human societies, strong nations survived. 43 
By 1866 Italy was united, and within a decade Rome was added to the nation-state. 49 
Flushed with success, Italian nationalists looked to Italian speaking territories that 
remained outside the new nation-state: Trieste, !stria, and Trentino as terra irredenta. 50 
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CHAPTER3 
IRREDENTISM AND WORLD WAR I 
The emergence of nationalism in the nineteenth century affected both the Italian and 
Southern Slav peoples. Italy became a unified state, but it still desired to regain historical 
lands. The Friulians developed an ethnic consciousness, while the Slovenes and Croats 
transformed their ethnic consciousness to a sense of nationalism, but all three remained under 
the dominion of the Habsburgs. In the late nineteenth century, as the power and prestige of 
the Habsburg dynasty diminished, the empire sought to retain its lands and authority as well 
as expand its influence, especially in the Balkans. 
Austria was gripped by crisis, having lost the war with France in 1859 and with 
Prussia in 1866. The old state apparatus tottered, exhausted by domestic strife and warfare 
with its neighbors. With interests in Italy and in the Balkans, Austria was too weak to fully 
manage her interests without help. Therefore, the empire had to become dependent on the 
support of at least one of the other great powers, and this meant that the empire was 
dependent on shifts in the international situation, which were beyond its control. 1 As the 
century came to an end, Austria associated with Germany and Italy in the Triple Alliance as 
she sought to retain control of the territories of Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia. This control 
would protect the vital line of communication from encroachment by Serbs and their Russian 
allies and would help Austria dominate the rest of the Balkan Peninsula. 2 
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The key nation in the Balkans for Austria-Hungary was Serbia which had achieved a 
semi-autonomous status in the Ottoman empire early in the nineteenth century. By 1878 
Serbia was independent but, under Austrian influence, tantamount to being a protectorate. 
Public opinion forced the abdication of the pro-Austrian King Milan Obrenovic in 1889 in 
favor of the pro-Russian King Alexander Karadjordjevic, who had designs on Bulgarian 
territory. 3 Consequently the balance of power changed in the Balkans. At the same time, 
other Serbs formed clandestine organizations which sought Serb irredentist claims in Bosnia, 
Dalmatia, the Military Frontier (Croatia and Slavonia), Montenegro and Macedonia. 
By the early twentieth century, the Balkans had become an important market for 
export which neither the Alliance nor its competitor, the Entente, could afford to neglect. 
Austria was ever alert to Russian, Serb and even German intrusions into the Balkans and 
threat to its strategic interests. In the era ofWeltpolitik, Germany developed imperialist 
ambitions of her own in the Ottoman Empire and in the Balkans, often at the expense of her 
Austro-Hungarian ally, yet there was little the Austrians could do to halt their increasing 
dependence on Germany. Russia continued to exert its influence in the Balkans in the name 
of Pan-Slavism, with the tacit support of her British and French allies, who had become 
increasingly obsessed with the growing German threat. 
The agreements on which these two alignments (Triple Alliance and the Entente) 
rested were defensive in nature, that is, the signatories pledged to come to the aid of others in 
event of attack by another power.4 Between 1878 and 1908, the balance of power 
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in the Balkans had been successfully preserved; however, the international accord was broken 
when Austria annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, which caused strong resentment in both Russia 
and Serbia. The Serbs, under King Peter Karadjordjevic, still hoped to acquire what they 
regarded as national lands in Bosnia. The Serbs turned to the Russians for help, and this 
caused a split between Austria and Russia. As the Ottoman Empire began to fail, others took 
advantage of its weakness. Tsar Nicholas II of Russia and King Vittorio Emmanuel II of 
Italy came to an agreement to enable Italy in 1911 to go to war with the Ottoman Empire 
over Tripoli, and during this same period the Serbs and Bulgarians made a series of pacts to 
attack the Turks in Macedonia and in Thrace.~ 
Italian Irredentism 
As Austria experienced problems in the Balkans, it also faced growing tensions in its 
Italian provinces. In Friuli the Friulian people inhabited both urban and rural areas. In 
Venezia-Giulia, Veneta-Italians lived in cities and towns, while Slovenes and Croats dwelled 
in the countryside. (Map 10). There was little problem drawing an ethnic line running north 
to south, from the Austrian border to the Adriatic Sea. West of the line were Friulians and 
Italians; east of the line were the Slavs. 6 There were never great disputes between the 
Slovenes and the Friulians; on the contrary, they shared a fiiendly relationship. Those 
Friulians coming under the jurisdiction of the Italians after 1866 were for the most part 
considered Italians, and the Friulian cultural features were not regarded as distinctive. Friuli 
was for the most part a linguistic island.7 To those Venetian-Italians, however, who lived in 
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the urban pockets of Italianita' (Trieste, Fiume, Gorizia and Pola) in the Dual Monarchy and 
who desired to join the Italian nation, the increasing numbers of Slavs who migrated to their 
cities caused grave concern. The Italians had long dominated the area in terms of commerce, 
industry and land ownership, but over time Slav merchants and artisans began to effectively 
compete. This social and economic challenge was particularly evident in Gorizia, Dalmatia 
and in Pola. In these areas some Italians were edged out of jobs by newly arrived Slavs. 
This competition for jobs and commercial enterprise led many Italians in Venezia-Giulia to 
look to the new Italian nation. They joined irredentist organizations calling for unification of 
historic Italian lands, i.e. former Roman and Venetian colonies in Venezia-Giulia, Istria and 
Dalmatia. 
During the late nineteenth century, Italy wanted its place in the sun. Rome had been 
won, the risorgimento had succeeded, but other Europeans did not take Italy seriously. The 
Italian language (actually the dialects of Venice and of Genoa), once a lingua franca 
throughout the Mediterranean, was being displaced by French and English. 8 Geopolitically 
speaking, the peninsula was best placed to dominate the Mediterranean. 9 Italy was 
preeminently a Mediterranean power in the widest sense of that term. British Prime Minister 
Arthur Lord Balfour at the Washington Naval Conference said, ''Italy is not an island, but for 
the purpose of this debate she counts as one. " 10 The beginning of work on the Suez canal 
gave strong impetus to imperialism, and Cavour, the statesman of unified Italy intended that 
the Italian merchant marine should be in the van of opening up of this passage to the East. 11 
Italy attempted two approaches to expand its influence: the irredentist one which was 
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oriented towards the continent and presented potential conflict with Austrian interests, and 
the alternative colonialist one which was oriented towards the Mediterranean and clashed 
with French aspirations. When northern Italians (Pietmontese, Lombards) controlled the 
government, state policy followed the anti-Austrian approach favoring participation in 
European power-politics. When southern Italians (Romans, Calabrians) held office, state 
policy emphasized the anti-French direction, particularly in the Mediterranean, e.g. the 
invasion of Libya. The Mediterranean orientation in the acquisition of African colonies had 
the advantage of being fashionable, forceful and activist; moreover, it avoided direct conflict 
with another great power. 12 This approach appealed to both the industrial and mercantile 
interests and to the landowners in southern Italy, who nervously observed increasing 
discontent of a land hungry peasantry. 
Italy's rival in the Mediterranean, France, began to revive after its defeat by Germany. 
The Italians resented French pretensions to be the tutor ofltaly, and the French occupation 
of Tunis in 1881 was a bitter blow to Italian prestige. Therefore, Italy sought friends 
elsewhere. In May 1882, she signed the Triple Alliance. Italy promised to help Germany in 
the event of a French attack, or if Germany or Austria-Hungary were attacked by the French 
or Russians. In return, the Germans and Austrians promised to defend Italy against any 
French attack. 13 Within a few years, however, the alliance showed signs of strain. Italy's 
interests in the Balkans clearly conflicted with those of Austria. 
Irredentism espoused by Italian republicans and nationalists further strained these 
relations. Some adherents became radicalized, and in December 1882, 
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Guglielmo Oberdan, a Trieste student, was accused of plotting the assassination of Emperor 
Franz Joseph. 14 In the lands claimed by the irredentists-the cities and environs of Trieste, 
Gorizia, Fiume, Trentino and !stria-Italian was the principal tongue. The Trentino was a 
large Austrian wedge driven southward through the Dolomite mountain chain. After 
separation from Venice in 1866, the Italian inhabitants were isolated, and Austria 
progressively Germanized the province. The Italians of Trentino, as those ofFriuli, were 
largely oriented toward Catholic conservatism, and they opposed the radical, liberal forces at 
work in Italian irredentism. On the other hand, the Italian speaking people of Trieste and 
many Italianized Slavs took up the irredentist movement. Italian nationalists in Trieste 
looked longingly at the new united Italy. 15 Even the newly formed socialist unions favored 
Italian nationalism because Italian workers feared greater South Slav immigration and 
economic competition. 16 By 1910, the majority of industrial workers in Trieste were of 
Slovene descent. 17 (See Table 1, above.) 
Ethnic tensions between Slavs and Italians increased over time due to three things: 
first, the conflict of Italian and Croat interests in Dalmatia and Fiume; second, the Italian 
irredentist claims for the hinterland along the Isonzo and for Istria, which were largely 
populated by Slavs (Slovenes and Croats, respectively); and third, a general Italian racial 
contempt for "inferior'' Slavs. 18 On the whole, the atmosphere in Gorizia, Trieste and !stria 
was characterized by open ethnic conflict in competition for jobs and in school curricula. 
Italian irredentists argued that Italian culture and civilization were superior to that of the 
Slavs. They also argued that the Isonzo valley and the Istrian peninsula formed natural 
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frontiers and that the highlands east of the Isonzo were strategic positions for control of land 
traffic from east to west. 
The spiritual father of Italian irredentism-an Awakener-was the poet Gabriele 
D' Annunzio. His play, La Nave (The Ship), about medieval Venice which celebrated Italy's 
past naval role in the Mediterranean, called the Italians to "arm the prow and sail towards the 
world." D' Annunzio grasped the role that the words and images of an artist might play in 
forging the modem masses into a weapon for a militant new nation. 19 He was strongly 
influenced by Social Darwinism and the prevailing theories of degeneration of society 
(Friedrich Nietzsche's critique of Western decadence). D' Annunzio saw the entire Italian 
race engaged once again in a struggle for existence. 20 This "first Duce" glorified Rome and 
its modern destiny in an imperialist world. 
One distortion of nationalism-imperialism, that is the subordination of a few or 
several countries by one dominating state-became a fascist goal. The idea of a new empire 
emerged from the myth of Italian spiritual supremacy, and the Italians followed Mazzini's 
mission to civilize the barbarian. In the years following unification, Italy aspired to greater 
glory, yet returned from the Congress of Berlin in 1878 with no territorial or colonial gains, 
except a limited sphere of influence in Albania, and a realization that she held little stature 
with other European powers. 
Another distortion of nationalism-irredentism, that is reclaiming historical 
lands-was driven by the myth ofltalian superiority.21 The Italians living in Venezia-Giulia 
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and Trentino called for redeeming historic Italian lands. This new theme was taken up by the 
Liberal government, for it had not succeeded in achieving its colonial ambitions. 
Neutrality 
In August 1914, Austria-Hungary invaded Serbia, with German concurrence, but 
without consulting the Italians who pledged to remain neutral if an ally declared war on 
another country. The Austrians were seen as the aggressors, and most Italians were opposed 
to Italian participation in the war. 22 The former Liberal Prime Minister, Giovanni Giolitti, 
and the Church hierarchy pursued a neutralist policy. More fervently, the Syndicalists 
(Unions), Republicans and Socialists had long opposed continued Italian membership in the 
Triple Alliance, fearful that membership would sooner or later force Italy's entry into war. 
As early as March 1914 these parties as well as the anarchists, staged a ''Red Week", a series 
of general strikes against Italian membership in the Alliance. 23 
Some Italians, however, were concerned that if Italy backed out and the Central 
Powers won the war, they might seek to avenge Italian betrayal. If the Entente won, there 
would be no reason for them to concede to Italy the coveted lands of Trentino or 
Venezia-Giulia. So the government tried to bargain with the Central Powers in early 1915. 
Italy would remain neutral if it received Trentino, the western side of the Isonzo river and a 
portion of the province of Gorizia-Gradisca. At the same time the Italians demanded that the 
city of Trieste and its environs should become a neutral independent city-state. Austria, 
however was resigned to only minor changes, agreeing to cede only Italian-speaking parts of 
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Trentino and a small corner of Gorizia-Gradisca province. 24 The Austrians feared that the 
Romanians would likeWise demand territory in exchange for neutrality. 
Germany sent its former Chancellor, Prince Bernhard Bulow, to Rome to negotiate 
for the Central Powers. 25 He was shocked at the demand for Trieste and said that Vienna 
would never cede Trieste. For the Austrians, Trieste was the key to the Adriatic; not only 
was it a major port for trade, but it was the principal port of the Austrian navy. Loss of 
Austrian control of Trieste would be the loss of the "lungs of the empire." Nevertheless, 
Germany attempted to persuade Franz Joseph, and the Emperor agreed to cede all of 
Trentino, including the city of Trento, but he would not give up Trieste and the Adriatic 
coastal areas. The latter offer was unacceptable to the Italian Liberals who had pledged their 
support to the irredentists. The Foreign Minister, Baron Giovanni Sidney Sonnino, on 
February 12, 1915 withdrew from discussions and warned that operations by 
Austria-Hungary in the Balkans without Italian agreement were an infringement of Article 
VII of the Alliance. 26 He gave the Alliance time to consider his demands. On April 10 the 
Italians made their last demand: Trentino, Gorizia-Gradisca, an autonomous Trieste, the 
Dalmatian islands, a small indemnity and a guarantee of no interference in Albania. On May 
10 the Alliance made a counter offer, giving Italy the western side of the Isonzo, the Italian 
speaking areas of Gorizia-Gradisca, Trentino, and making Trieste an independent free port. 
Prime Minister Antonio Salandra in a bold stroke of duplicity, sent a courier to London on 
February 16, 1915 with the suggestion that Italy was open to a good offer from the Entente. 
With the Russian victories in the Carpathians and the German failure to break through the 
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Mame, Salandra judged that victory for the Entente was in sight. 27 He demanded not only 
Trentino and Trieste, but all of Cisalpine Tyrol (to the Brenner Pass), much of Dalmatia 
and a share of the Ottoman empire. On April 27, Lord Edward Grey, the British Foreign 
Minister, countered with a compromise proposal that was accepted by Italy. The Italians 
did not negotiate further, for they feared that the war might soon be over. In addition, 
Russia, as protector of the Slavs, had insisted on halving Italy's claims in Dalmatia. In 
return for the whole of Trentino, Venezia-Giulia, including Gorizia-Gradisca and Trieste, 
Istria and the Dalmatian islands, Foreign Minister Sonnino compromised by relinquishing 
the port of Fiume to the South Slavs. Thus the Treaty of London was sealed.23 
The treaty was the result of secret negotiations by Salandra and Sonnino. The Italian 
parliament and the king had little or no input. Salandra gained reluctant acceptance of the 
secret treaty by presenting a de facto agreement and by threatening to resign if the agreement 
was not accepted. His resignation would have created a governmental crisis. Therefore, the 
treaty was accepted by both the Italians and the Entente, provided that the Italians 
commenced fighting in one month to put pressure on the Austrians. The Italians declared 
war only against Austria. Yet, the rapidity of secret negotiations caught the Italian General 
Staff off guard. During the negotiations, the Italian General Staff was not informed about 
what was going on, and its war plans conflicted with the objectives outlined in the treaty. 
The general staff assumed that offensive operations would be conducted against France. On 
the eastern front of Venezia-Giulia, Italian defenses and offensive power were ill-prepared, 
and the Italians had only one month to mobilize. The Chief of the General Staff, Raffaele 
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Cadoma, and his staff found that mobilization required 3 5, 000 officers and over four year 
classes to fill out its divisions (800,000 men). There was a deficit of shells, cartridges, 
machine guns and transport, and the morale of the active forces' cadre was low due to the 
trials of combat and occupation in the Libyan campaign. 29 The war almost immediately 
became one of stalemate on the Carso. For two years, the Italians and Austrians fought 
eleven indecisive campaigns along the Isonzo River. On October 24, 1917, disaster struck. 
The Austrians with German support broke through the Italian lines above Caporetto. 30 
German and Austrian-Hungarian troops poured onto the Friulian plain forcing the Italians 
back to the Piave River to defend "the sacred soil ofltaly."31 The newly constituted Italian 
army regrouped and held at the river. Morale gradually rose and in November 1918 the 
Italians with Allied help won at Vittorio Veneto. 32 
In the battle zone along the Isonzo, the Friulians remained passive during the war. 
Since they were generally well treated by the Habsburgs and since their inclinations were 
toward Austro-Catholic conservatism, their allegiance was still with the Habsburgs. 
Although some gave assistance to their Italian cousins, the people ofFriuli saw the war as a 
disruption of their lives largely brought on by outside Italian irredentist pressures. 33 The 
Friulians, as with many civilians caught in the struggle, either stayed in place or emigrated 
away from the front lines. 
The South Slavs 
During World War I most of the non-Serb South Slavs remained loyal to the 
Habsburgs. Slovene and Croat troops distinguished themselves in the service of the empire. 
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The general support for the monarch by the Slovenes did not change during the first three 
years of the war. The leader of the Slovene Clerical Party, Slovene parliamentary leader and 
member of the Reichsrat, Anton Korosec, in a letter of January 191 7 to the Austrian Prime 
Minister, expressed the loyalty of the Slovene people. 
In Croatia, the situation was somewhat different. The Croats, who were under a 
chauvinistic Hungarian regime, preferred separation from the empire. Anton Mihailovic, a 
moderate Croat nationalist, supported by Stefan Radie of the Peasant Party, desired an 
independent state, while Croat Socialists came out for a union of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
in a future South Slav state. The Slovenes kept themselves aloof from either movement. 
Anton Korosec, however, was eventually converted to the view that the destiny of the 
Slovenes lay in an autonomous South Slav state. In May 1917 Korosec demanded 
independence of all Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in one national state under the scepter of the 
Habsburgs. All three major Slovene parties-the Clerical Party, the Liberal Party and the 
Social Democrats-wanted more autonomy for Slovenia, but within the empire. 34 Most 
Slovenes and Croats expected the Habsburg Empire to survive the war. 
Nevertheless, in 1914-1915 some prominent political figures from Croatia and 
Slovenia chose to emigrate and seek a South Slav nation independent of the empire. The 
most important emigre group was the Yugoslav Committee, led by Ante Trumbic and Franc 
Supilo. The committee was entirely unofficial. Its major task was to carry on a propaganda 
campaign to inform the Allies of the position of the south Slavs within the empire and to 
agitate for South Slav unification. 
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The committee's relations with the Serb government-in-exile were uneasy. Nikola 
Pasic, the Serb Premier~ would have preferred to play the role of spokesmen for all South 
Slavs. 3~ He wanted Serbia to act as the Piedmont of the South Slavs with a Serb 
Karadjordjevic dynasty forming the nucleus of a Yugoslav nation-state. 36 There was 
undoubtedly a divergence in the aims of the Serb government and the Yugoslav Committee. 
The Yugoslav Committee held a conference on Corfu in the summer of 191 7 with 
representatives of the Serb government. Pasic insisted on a highly centralized state in which 
the Serbs, as the most numerous element, would be dorp.inant, while Trumbic advocated an 
arrangement in which the constituent elements would have considerable autonomy. This 
federalist arrangement advocated by Trumbic emerged in the fourteen points of the Corfu 
Declaration, signed on July 20, 1917. The Serbs refused to sign the declaration. Thus the 
Yugoslav Committee was afraid that Pasic might bargain with the Great Powers at the 
expense of the Croats and Slovenes. 37 
The relations between the Yugoslav Committee and Italy were at the best strained. 
Andrea Torre, a member of the Italian Parliament, invited Supilo and Trumbic to Rome to 
open a Congress of Oppressed Nationalities.38 There the South Slavs stressed that the unity 
and independence of the South Slavs were of vital importance to Italy, because a stable 
non-aggressive neighbor was better than an ambitious empire. Future boundaries could be 
settled amicably on the basis of ethnicity and the right of peoples to determine their own fate. 
Giolliti opened the congress, and a number of members of the Italian Parliament participated. 
At the conclusion of the congress, the conferees signed the Pact of Rome, which endorsed 
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the right of self-determination. Italy, however, did not officially sign the document, for the 
government saw that its commitment to self-determination could prejudice its case in future 
territorial claims. 
The war was rapidly coming to a close, and in its final weeks the monarchy fell apart. 
In an effort to hold his lands together, Emperor Charles, Franz Joseph's successor, declared 
in October 1918 that Austria would be reorganized as a federal state, but it was too late. In 
an action paralleling events elsewhere in the empire, a National Council of Slovenes, Croats 
and Serbs was formed in Zagreb in October with the Slovene clerical leader Korosec as 
Council President. Most of the participants pushed for unification, except for the Croat 
Peasant Party which saw the new state as an enlarged Serbia. 39 The ideological and political 
stage was set for the tumultuous early years of Yugoslavia. 
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CHAPTER4 
THE INTERWAR YEARS 
In the autumn of 1918, the Italians won the war at Vittorio Veneta, and the Italian 
aspirations for regaining terra irredenta were about to be realized. Italy had entered the war 
against the Dual Monarchy, but with the demise of the Habsburg Empire Italian claims were 
no longer primarily directed against Austria but against the South Slavs. Italian Liberals 
expected Yugoslavia to become an unpleasant neighbo~ on the shores of the Adriatic 
insisting on the ethnic principle of self-determination. Thus, Italy abandoned much of her 
previous ethnic argument for Venezia-Guilia, !stria and Dalmatia. Italy would now justify 
territorial gains based on strategic frontiers and economic ties, which would give Italy 
further advantage in retaining an inordinately large part of !stria and a string of Dalmatian 
islands. 1 
After the Allied victory in November 1918, the new prime minister, Vittorio 
Orlando, went to Versailles to demand implementation of the 1915 Treaty of London. 2 There, 
Orlando and Sonnino were confronted with President Woodrow Wilson, who 
declared his nation fought for the self-determination of oppressed nationalities. 3 In a letter 
to Sonnino, the former foreign minister, Carlo Sforza, although officially out of the 
government, advised that the peace conference would pay homage to Wilson's principles, 
but each participant would think only of safeguarding his own interests. ''We alone---will risk 
being in disagreement with Wilson---and risk compromising all of our interests. ''4 
48 
Following this principle of self-determination, Wilson proposed a line dividing Italy 
and the new Yugoslav state based on ethnic criteria and refused to concede either Fiume or 
Dalmatia to Italy. 5 Thus Wilson became the arch-villain to the Italians. Through negotiations 
and threatened withdrawal from the talks, Italy was able to acquire Trentino to the Brenner 
Pass and Trieste. The Italian army occupied !stria and Dalmatia, placing both under de facto 
Italian sovereignty. 
Trieste itself was given to Italy without much debate. As the terminus of the 
Sudbahn railway, and as a great mercantile emporium for Central Europe, it was a rich prize. 
It was not such an unqualified advantage for the city of Trieste itself, since a political frontier 
now severed the city from its German and Slav hinterland, leaving it a head without a body. 
Carlo Sforza foresaw the possible decline in commerce. Fiume was more difficult for it was 
not discussed in the London Treaty. In 1919, however, some nationalists wanted to renounce 
the treaty claims on Slav speaking Dalmatia in exchange for Fiume where the Italians 
represented over eighty percent of the population. 
On February 7, 1919, Italy asked that the Treaty of London to be modified to 
include Fiume. 6 Italy already had won !stria, Trieste and the Dalmatian Islands, then why 
not Fiume. This additional demand, however, caused the Allies to perceive Italy as 
opportunist, and it weakened Italy's position. President Wilson, who objected to all secret 
treaties, stated that if Italy did not adhere to the London pact, the other great powers were 
free to discuss the claims of both Italy and Yugoslavia regarding Venezia-Giulia. The 
Yugoslavs at the Peace Conference (represented by the Serbs only) pointed out that Italy 
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had agreed to the ethnic principle in the Pact of Rome, but as noted above, the pact was not 
signed by the Italian government. The Yugoslavs claimed that the new border should run 
along the old Halo-Austrian frontier from the west of the Isonzo River, giving Yugoslavia 
Tarvisio, Gorizia, Istria, (including Trieste) Fiume and Dalmatia. Wilson proposed that 
Italy should relinquish Dalmatia and Fiume. There was obviously no boundary in Istria and 
Venezia-Giulia which would satisfy both Italy and Yugoslavia. Frustrated, the president 
drew the borders along the "Wilson Line". (Map 11). This attempt at compromise was not 
an ethnic division, for it left to Italy 370,000 Slovenes and Croats, while 75,000 Italians 
were left in Yugoslavia. Angered, Orlando temporarily withdrew the Italian delegation for 
a few weeks. Upon the return of the Italians to the conference, the Italians were able to 
obtain most of the Istrian peninsula with Trieste and Pola, but not Fiume. 
After Wilson's incapacitation by a stroke in January 1920, the Italian position 
improved since Wilson could not veto any other Italian claims, especially its claims for 
Fiume. The conference left Italy to finalize its north-eastern border through direct dealings 
with Yugoslavia. On November 12, 1920, the Allies signed the Treaty ofRapallo, which gave 
Italy the Kanai Valley (northern Friuli) and Venezia-Giulia, including the line ofltalian 
occupation. Yugoslavia received Dalmatia, except for the city of Zara (Zadar). Fiume was 
made an independent free port. 
Fiume had been an issue from the early years of the century onwards. The Italians 
felt that ports on the Adriatic and Aegean were important as sacred symbols ofltalianita'. 
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At the war's end the Italian citizens of Fiume invited Italian warships and troops, but the 
Allies ruled that occupation should be inter-Allied, consisting of British, American, French 
and Italian forces. This Allied occupation further raised tensions with the Italian speaking 
majority. After the murder of five French occupation soldiers as a result of rioting by the 
Italians, the French withdrew. 7 On September 12, 1919, in a comic opera scene, 
D' Annunzio with his Legionari marched from Trieste to occupy Fiume. Rather than risking 
a confrontation, the Allies abandoned the city to the Italians. The new Prime Minister, 
Francesco Nitti, attempted to deploy regular Italian Army troops to facilitate the transition 
of the city into an independent state under the Charter of the League of Nations, but his 
generals refused a confrontation with D' Annunzio. Next, Nitti established a blockade by 
the Italian Navy to force D' Annunzio out, but D' Annunzio circumvented the blockade by 
forming his own ''Illyrian pirates." The Fiume imbroglio ended when Mussolini sent an 
Italian general to assume administration of the city in September 1923, and on January 27, 
1924, Mussolini signed the Pact of Rome which gave Italy sovereignty over Fiume. (Map 12). 
Yugoslavia Between the Wars 
The territorial changes introduced after the First World War were the result of 
bargaining among the great power victors. Despite Wilson's pledge for self-determination, 
the new nation-state of Yugoslavia had little influence at Versailles, and the hopes of the 
South Slavs for a unified state were to be confronted with traditional ethnic rivalries. The 
nucleus of the new Yugoslavia was formed out of the kingdom of Serbia. On December 1, 
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1918, the Serbs called for a constitutional assembly and dominated the proceedings. On St 
Vitus Day, June 28, 1921, the new government published the Vidovdan Constitution. 8 
The Serb Premier, Nikola Pasic had achieved a pyrrhic victory in the approval of 
the Vidovdan constitution, which made his ambition of a kingdom of Greater Serbia a 
reality. It did nothing to heal the deep rift between the Serbs and non-Serbs, the tendency 
of the former to impose hegemony over the latter. The balance of power within the 
government tended to lean towards the monarch rather than towards the single chamber 
Parliament (Skupstina), as the constitution conferred considerable authority to King 
Alexander. 
The new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes faced significant problems. In 
addition to meeting the complexities of serving three south Slav linguistic groups, the 
kingdom also had Montenegrins, Bosnian Muslims and large minorities of Albanians, 
Romanians, Turks, Czechs, Slovaks, Russians, Italians, Bulgars and Greeks. It also had to 
confront the tensions among three main religious groups-Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and 
Muslim. Besides the problems of integrating this myriad of linguistic, ethnic and religious 
groups, there were also formidable administrative problems. Six customs areas, five 
currencies, three banking systems and four legal systems had to be merged. 9 
The founders of Yugoslavia assumed incorrectly that South Slavs spoke a common 
language, had a common origin, and were ethnically similar. They did not recognize ethnic 
differences connected with religion, memories of medieval states and historical traditions, 
for these were considered artificial or irrelevant. 10 Ethnic separateness and identity did 
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persist, and ethnic aspirations more often than not overcame loyalty to the new state. 11 
Some ethnic communities, particularly the Croats, feared loss of identity. Yet many citizens 
of the new kingdom hoped for the kind of nation that Bishop Strossmayer and his 
contemporaries had advocated. 12 
In the domestic political arena, the diverse ethnic groups pursued varying goals. 
The parliament malfunctioned from the beginning because of the conflict between 
Slovene-Croat desires for federalism and Serb centralization. For Serbia, unification meant 
the liberation of remaining unredeemed lands, while for' Croatia and Slovenia unification 
meant enhanced regional autonomy. 13 The liberal-democratic institutions in the kingdom 
were neither sufficiently developed nor rooted deeply enough to give representative 
goverrunent an opportunity to develop. 
Constant turmoil reigned in the Parliament. The Croat Peasant Party leader, Radie, 
constantly disputed the policies of the Serb Radical Prime Minister Pasic and his successors. 
In June of 1928, insults between the two parties were answered by pistol shots, and Radie 
was mortally wounded. 14 In January 1929, King Alexander dissolved parliament, 
suspended the constitution and appointed a new goverrunent. A decade of political turmoil 
was over. The political system of the Vidovdan Constitution had not been able to establish 
a compromise between the interests of nationalities and regions. 15 
The Dictatorship 
The ease with which Alexander was able to overthrow the constitution 
demonstrated that the democratic experiment had failed. Alexander knew that he could 
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rely on the army because the majority of the senior officers were loyal Serbs. 16 The royal coup 
provoked no real protest. At first, the king was popular. He de-emphasized the Serb aspects 
of his government, encouraging other ethnic groups to participate for the unity of 
the country. Many Slovenes joined the government or accepted lucrative posts in the civil 
or diplomatic service or in state-controlled enterprises, because they had the advantage of 
being bilingual in both Slovene and Serbo-Croatian. Few Croats and Serbs had that ability. 17 
In addition, the Slovenes were the best educated nationality in Yugoslavia. 
Alexander sought to reduce the influence of regional or ethnic interests. In so doing 
he introduced several unpopular laws. One was the Sokol Law of December 4, 1929 which 
dissolved Catholic Sokols (physical training and cultural societies among the Croats and 
Slovenes) . 18 The king also discouraged purely Serb activities. He intended to merge all 
ethnic groups into a common sentiment towards a unified Yugoslavia. 
In September 1931, Alexander drew up a new constitution which legitimized his 
special powers acquired during the dictatorship. The new constitution provided for an 
Assembly elected by universal male suffrage, and a Senate, half of whose members were 
appointed by the king and half by the local government assemblies. It introduced new 
administrative units, known as banovine. (Map 14). Each banovina took the geographical 
name of a local river. Much of the former Slovenia was renamed Dravska, after the Drava 
River. The governor 02.fil!) of each banovina was directly responsible to the government in 
Belgrade. All the lines of power led back to Belgrade, and there the king exercised 
ultimate control. 19 
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In 1932 Milan Srstkic, a hard-line Serb became prime minister. As a result 
of his determined pro-Serb policies, discontent mounted throughout the country. In 
Croatia there were violent incidents involving Croat nationalists. Even Slovenia was 
agitated, and in the second largest city of Maribor, a "communist plot" was unearthed 
among the officers of the garrison, and the accused received death sentences. Opposition 
to the regime intensified, highlighted by the Zagreb Manifesto, issued by Croats and 
Slovenes, who asked for changes to make the government "an association of interests to 
safeguard the three nations." Even the perennially moderate Korosec, who asked for 
autonomy for the Slovenes, was arrested and interned. 
Thus, after four years, the dictatorship had succeeded in alienating all the organized 
parties of the country, with its own supporters becoming increasingly divided.20 In addition 
to the political crisis, the world-wide depression of the thirties affected the already weak 
economy. The chief export, agricultural products, fell as world prices collapsed, and the 
National Bank's supply of foreign exchange ran short as the export trade fell heavily. 
Exchange control prevented money from leaving the country and foreign trade was 
paralyzed. The isolation of the government from large numbers of its citizens became 
increasingly apparent. On October 9, 1934, during a state visit to France, King Alexander 
was assassinated by an agent of the Croat extremists, the U stashas. 21 In the royal succession, 
Alexander's son Peter was next in line, but he was only a few years old; therefore, Prince 
Paul (Alexander's cousin) acted as regent.22 Although he hated politics, Prince Paul 
reluctantly assumed a leading role. 23 
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During the reign of the Regent Paul in the 1930s the Slovenes benefited from the 
union.- Due to their relatively strong financial institutions (cooperative banks and 
cooperative marketing unions) and less dependence on agriculture, they did not suffer the 
detrimental effects of economic depression as much as the rest of the country. They also 
increased their stature within the social and political realms. The Slovenes, few in number 
( 1. 2 million out of 12 million), skillfully exploited their economic and linguistic advantages 
to enable them to maintain a balance between the Croats and Serbs and to obtain a large 
measure of autonomy. They were able to maintain their schooling in the Slovene language 
and to establish an additional university (in Maribor, besides the University at Lubiana). 
The principal grievances of the Slovenes were administrative rather than political. Slovenes 
complained chiefly of excessive centralization. For instance, they could not build a road 
without Belgrade's authority. 19 
To the Croats, the dictatorship reinforced their antagonism against Serb style 
centralism. Out of this dissatisfaction grew the secessionist U stasha movement increasingly 
inspired by Nazism and Fascism. 20 The historical roots of the U stashas lay in the nineteenth 
century. Ante Starcsevic was a Croat poet who founded the Party of Croat Rights while 
Croatia was under repressive Hungarian rule after 1867. He promoted a distinct Croat 
tradition, a Unity of Croatia as opposed to Strossmayer's Union of Yugoslavs. Starcsevic 
was born in the Serb-dominated former military frontier, where he nurtured a radical form 
of racism against the Serbs. 21 The U stashas believed the Yugoslav government under the 
royal house was a 'great-Serb dictatorship' which could be overthrown only by mass 
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action; therefore the Ustashas and their confederates, the Frankovci, performed terrorist 
acts or violence against the Serbs. The majority ofUstashas were peasants from the poorer 
mountain regions of Croatia and their rebellions were prompted by high taxes, corrupt 
administration and the difficult conditions of military service. 22 
The U stashas justified their spiritual values of traditional morality and religion as 
a bulwark against Marxist materialism and W estem decadence. Many of the leaders of the 
Ustashas took refuge in Fascist Italy in the thirties. Thus the Italian Fascists saw a potential 
ally in the U stashas, began to finance them and promoted their fascist ideology in order to 
gain the advantage from the opportunity to intervene in Yugoslav internal affairs. 
The Pre-War Years 
In 1920, Yugoslavia joined the Little Entente (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and 
Romania) in order to prevent a resurgent Hungary from threatening the peace settlement 
and to prevent a Habsburg restoration. Hungary developed at that time a friendship with 
Italy. Yugoslavia's one great power supporter was France, for she defended Yugoslavia 
politically and economically, and stood firm on the territorial clauses of the peace treaties. 
By the 193 Os, the Slovenes and moderate Croats, as opposed to the extreme U stashas, 
feared the growing strength and rhetoric of Fascist Italy, and therefore supported 
Alexander's foreign policy of alliance with France. 
The victory of the French Socialists in the elections of 1936 and world-wide 
depression, however, caused France to withdraw much of her financial support to Yugoslavia. 
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The Yugoslavs realized that the policy of alliances under French influence was no longer 
practicable. On the worst of terms with her neighbors, Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria, and 
with her French patron alienated and preoccupied, Yugoslavia was isolated and needed 
alliances for defense. The prince regent did his best to find security by linking the Little 
Entente with a pact of Balkan States (Greece, Romania, Turkey). 23 The regency 
government realized, however, that regional alliances could not protect Yugoslavia against 
its more aggressive neighbors. Without adequate support from Britain and France, the 
regency veered to a policy of neutrality in 1936. Early· in 1937 Yugoslavia signed a treaty 
of friendship with Italy, and a pact of "eternal and indissoluble" friendship with Bulgaria. 
Many individuals within the government, however, especially Serbs, felt alarm at the 
successive departures from the policy of reliance on France and the Little Entente. 
With the disruption of traditional trade patterns during the depression, Yugoslavia, 
as other East European states, came to depend more and more on Germany as her main 
customer and supplier. During the last years of the thirties about fifty-five percent of 
foreign trade was with Germany and an additional fifteen percent was with Italy. Because 
of this economic dependence, especially sale of agricultural products in exchange for 
manufactured items, Prince Paul was forced to rely more on the Axis. 
By the end of 1938, the prime minister, Milan Stojadinvovic, was convinced that he 
was backing the right horse in the Germans as trade conditions improved, and that the time 
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was ripe for an election. 24 The prince-regent called for a national government to work out 
transitional arrangements to a new constitution, which would satisfy a majority of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes. This action caused a wave of enthusiasm, for a common dissatisfaction 
with the government's pro-Axis and dictatorial policies had drawn the Croat Peasant Party 
and Serb opposition parties closer together. The election resulted in a public rejection of 
the government's policies and led to formation of a new coalition government. 2j Yet for 
radical Croats this government did not satisfy their desire for more autonomy. More 
moderate Croats, hoping to divert the populace away from the radicalism of the U stashas, 
convinced the crown to set up a semi-autonomous Province of Croatia under the 
Understanding (Sporazum) of 1939.26 Still, neither side was fully satisfied with this 
understanding. The more radical Croats wanted independence, and Serb opposition 
leaders saw the agreement as a half-measure which separated Croats and Serbs at a crucial 
hour. 
The beginning of the Second World War increased Yugoslavia's dependence on the 
Third Reich. Although she was able to maintain neutrality for sixteen months, German 
economic and political pressure grew to the point that the regency, on March 25, 1941, 
joined the Axis satellites and adhered to the Tripartite Pact of Germany, Italy and Japan. 
Two days later, on March 27th, in reaction to the signing of the pact, the military staged a 
bloodless military coup which brought the regency to an end. 27 The coup brought together 
all opposition parties into a broad coalition with the object of avoiding the commitment to 
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the Tripartite Pact. Immediately the government signed a treaty of friendship with Moscow, 
but there was too little time to further develop a foreign policy, for war was at hand. 
The Rise of Fascism 
The events occurring in neighboring Italy strongly influenced Yugoslav politics. The 
rise of fascism exploited strong anti-Slav and anti-Marxist sentiment. Italian Fascism was a 
volatile mixture of ex-Socialists, Syndicalists, Futurists and war veterans. 28 The post-war 
years were those of economic depression in Italy (particularly in the northern industrial 
areas). Industry needed to revert to peacetime production and the return of four million 
soldiers to the economy meant unemployment. There were 130,000 demobilized officers, 
mostly lower middle class, who were eager to retain the status they had achieved in the army. 
The combination of unemployment, inflation and labor unrest threatened the newly 
demobilized soldiers. In their view the central liberal government had abdicated its 
responsibilities. Many of the discontented were susceptible to radical right wing propaganda 
and were drawn into squadristi (bands which terrorized the countryside during the post war 
years). Both anti-Socialists and ultra-nationalists gained active support frorp. hordes of young 
ex-servicemen, especially the black-shirted commandos, who found it difficult to return to 
civilian life. These veterans became the cadre of fascism. 
Trieste was a hotbed of fascism, not only because of the threat of socialis~ but also 
for the Italian irredentist spirit which manifested itself in anti-Slav feelings. As soon as the 
Italian army occupied Venezia-Giulia in 1918, extreme Italian nationalists began to persecute 
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Slovenes. 29 The Italians feared that the large Slavic population in this area could create a 
demand for a plebiscite. The unsettled border situation, together with divergent economic 
and nationalist interests, provided a fertile ground for the squadristi. In early 1919 during 
a fascist street assembly, a fascist youth was knifed. The local fascist leader, Francesco 
Giunta, immediately claimed that Slav nationalists provoked the incident and marched his 
group to the Hotel Balkan, headquarters of Slovene cultural and political organizations in 
Trieste, Slovenski narodni dom (Slovene people's house), and burned the building down as 
nearby Italian occupation troops joined in the assault. 
By 1924, the Italians instituted a radical Italianization program in Venezia-Giulia. 
Slovene political and social leaders, including priests and intellectuals, were interned to an 
island off the Dalmatian coast. The once flourishing Slovene cooperative system in banking 
and marketing collapsed, forcing the peasants to become indebted to Italian banks. When 
the peasants failed to repay their debts, their property was foreclosed. Slovene and Croat 
schools became Italian state schools. The Slavic press and political parties were 
suppressed or abolished. The use of Slovene and Croat languages was forbidden in all 
state institutions and in all public places, including churches. 30 Italian had to be spoken in 
public offices, courts, schools and churches. Even German and Slav surnames were 
Italianized, and inscriptions on tombstones were changed.31 Ultimately in order to make 
the te~on as completely Italian as possible, the state encouraged immigration from the 
south. 
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Such measures met with strong resistance. Local priests led a cultural protest, 
continuing to preach in German or Slovene. In the newly occupied regions of Venezia-
Giulia where Slovenes and Croats were in a majority, greater resistance took form. Italian 
teachers were driven out of schools, bombs went off regularly in public buildings, and 
terrorists assassinated police and militiamen. Although Mussolini spoke in favor of good 
Yugoslav relations when the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1924, the rigid program of 
Italianization embittered relations between the two states. Numerous migrations of 
Slovenes and Croats from Venezia-Giulia to Yugoslavia resulted in a Yugoslav irredentist 
movement. When the first Slavic resistance group attempted terrorist tactics in 1929, the 
fascists reacted with harsh counter-measures and executed a number of Slovenes and 
Croats. These martyrs became symbols of Italian repression of the Slavs. 38 
The Socialists of Trieste and Venezia-Giulia met a similar fate. The large working 
class had become increasingly militant. As members of the Socialist Party, they supported 
an independent Trieste rather than annexation by Italy. This stand resulted from the fact that 
Triestine industrial workers and their union leaders had become multi-ethnic in composition 
since the turn of the century. The Slovene-Croat Socialist Party had joined the Italian 
Socialists to form a unified socialist program. Following the war, the potential political 
strength of the workers frightened the region's middle-classes who formed the backbone of 
the Italian nationalist movement, and the fascists ably exploited this fear. The same fascist 
armed bands fought against general strikes of 1919-1921. When the workers built 
barricades, the fascists, assisted by the occupation army, demolished them. 
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Mussolini and the Fascist Myth 
Benito Mussolini was born in the Italian province of Romagna in 1883. His father, 
a socialist blacksmith, named his son after Benito Juarez (the Mexican revolutionary). In 
his youth Mussolini became that classic figure ofltalian society, the embittered poor 
intellectual. He read voraciously, especially in literature and philosophy, while supporting 
himself by a series of short-lived jobs in school-teaching and in the building trades. The 
socialist movement offered him a means of self-expression. 39 
Mussolini was influenced by the French syndicalist, Georges Sorel, who sought a 
moral stiffening of mankind, which he believed was naturally decadent. All progress was an 
illusion. Social change would not come naturally as Marx had suggested, but by the active 
will of the workers. 40 Vilfredo Pareto shared Sorel' s ideas but added the importance of the 
function of myths in stirring the workers and the theory of an elite. The elite, according to 
Pareto, were those individuals who had a remarkable degree of intelligence, character and 
presence. The elite needed to use the motive forces of religion, tradition and patriotism to 
urge a people toward a given social objective and even beyond it as a spiritual goal. In 
Mussolini's mind, Britain and France had become decadent, but Italy was a new spiritual 
force. The Nietzschen Superman, Julius Caesar, created an empire. Mussolini considered 
his destiny wa~ to recreate the empire. 
As the First World War approached, he saw the war as a reaction against positivism 
and materialism, and it was necessary to purify and renew the Italians.41 The entry of 
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Italy into the war would be the victory of Mazzinian Italy, the opportunity to introduce the 
superior Roman culture to the barbarians. On November 14, 1914 in the Italian Socialist 
daily Avanti, Mussolini began to explain why war was necessary for the destiny of the 
Italian people. He turned his flaming oratory against the neutralists. On November 25th 
the orthodox Socialist Party leaders expelled Mussolini from the party. Mussolini went off 
to war and came back to battle his new enemy, his former socialist colleagues. 
When peace came, Mussolini formed Fasci di Combattimento in 1919. The Fasci 
had the usual radical program--a constituent assembly, abolition of the Senate, land for the 
peasants and seizure of church property. The movement, however, was restricted to a few 
major centers of ultra-patriotism--Milano, Bologna, and Trieste.42 The real breakthrough 
came in central Italy, in the province of Emilia, where landlords and lease holders reacted 
against the victorious socialist leagues and against governmental agricultural policy. The 
fascist squad became the ideal instrument for breaking up socialist dominance in the country. 
By late 1921 fascism already meant strike-breaking or enforced enrollment of workers into 
newly fanned national unions. Mussolini saw these unions as a means of disciplining and 
mobilizing labor. 
Mussolini embarked on a program of consensus building, for he realized that he 
needed more than thugs. He strove to recruit from other parties and classes. To gain 
acceptance, he seriously considered an alternative route to power through legal and 
parliamentary channels. The ras, leaders of local squadristi, were becoming uncontrollable. 
In August 1921 Mussolini agreed to sign a Pact of Pacification to bring about a truce with the 
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socialists to de-escalate civil strife. The ras rejected it, convinced that agrarian fascism would 
lose impetus. Mussolini was infuriated by the insubordination: ''Fascism can do without me? 
Doubtless, but I too can do very well without Fascism".43 
In the compromise, Mussolini acknowledged squadrismo as an indispensable and 
integral part of the movement, and the ras recognized him as the indispensable Duce. The 
movement was converted into a political party, the national Fascist Party. In return, Mussolini 
repudiated the truce with the socialists and proposed national syndicalism under party control. 
As the new party appeared to have discarded most of its radical demands, funds flowed in 
from both the industrial and agrarian sectors, while its political rivals--Liberals, Socialists and 
Catholics- rapidly became more disorganized. 
This parliamentary paralysis gave Mussolini an excellent opportunity to make a 
significant breakthrough. Mussolini promised an acceptable form of fascism--a movement to 
restore Italian power and prestige, to revive the economy by increasing productivity and 
abolishing perceived harmful state control and to reestablish law and order. In order to 
accomplish the latter, he had to reel in the ras. One of his first acts was to transform the 
squadristi into a national militia under his direct command. 
In October 1922, the Fascists planned to concentrate at Perugia for a march 
on Rome. Fearful of civil war, the king considered declaring a state of siege and calling out 
the army, but his staff advised a more conciliatory action. On the morning of October 28th, 
the king offered Mussolini a place in the government, which Mussolini accepted and used to 
suppress the other parties. 44 
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The Fascist State 
Fascism introduced a new element: the "nation is also the state." 
"The Fascist state is higher and more powerful than the 
personality, it is a force, but a spiritual force that talc es all 
the forms of a moral and intellectual life of man. "45 
Between 1925 and 1932 Mussolini successfully built an authoritarian state. The 
opposition parties and their press, together with non-fascist trade unions had been eliminated. 
The militia was brought under control, and the police had been efficiently reorganized.-46 The 
corporate state was instituted. 
Fascism became almost a religious conception. Italy was realizing its destiny, and 
the Italians were proud of their state and accomplishments. The cult of the Duce developed 
rapidly after 1926 and its devotees used religious symbolism to proclaim Mussolini as a new 
Messiah. ''Mussolini is always right" and ccBelieve, Obey, Fight" became slogans of the 
corporate state. Mussolini stated in his creed that, ''Discipline is the keystone of the power 
of nations"47 
The modem Italians inherited the myth of Rome. For only the second time in history 
there was a unified Italy; therefore there was a temptation to emulate the achievements of 
the Romans. In schools Italian history stressed the Roman heritage, and a classical education 
was mandatory for those entering the ruling elite.48 The party's propagandists increasingly 
provided examples of parallels between ancient Rome and the fascist regime. These included 
the colonization of Africa, control of the Adriatic and the Mediterrane~ and creation of an 
invincible army. 
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Italy intended to be a Mediterranean power, with a long coastline, two large offshore 
islands and colonial possessions in Africa; she also controlled Rhodes and the Dodecanese 
islands in the Aegean Sea. Italy was also a continental power, bordering France, Austria and 
the Balkans. As a Mediterranean power she required a strong navy; as a continental power 
she required a strong army. A powerful air force would enable her to control her space. For 
a country with limited resources this military ambition was too extensive; she had to establish 
priorities and manage her resources carefully. 
The possession of the Brenner Pass and the seaport of Trieste strengthened Italy's 
position in the north and presented opportunities for further expansion in central and eastern 
Europe. The emergence of Yugoslavia prevented Italy from annexing large tracts of the 
Dalmatian coast as promised in the Treaty of London, but the new Slav state was divided 
and unstable and posed no serious threat. Italy was prisoner in the Mediterranean for Britain 
and France controlled access to the seas. Mussolini resented the Allied dominance and 
declared that Italy could only become a truly independent great power "by breaking the 
chains and marching towards the oceans". 49 
In pursuing his aims of becoming a great power, Mussolini had to look elsewhere, 
to Germany. Although the initial contacts between Hitler and Mussolini were less than 
impressive, Mussolini saw that the anti-Bolshevism espoused by the National Socialists 
could be the connecting link in establishing better relations with a potential ally. In October 
1936 Count Galeazzo Ciano, the new foreign minister, went to Berlin to meet with his 
counterpart, Joachim von Ribbentrop. As a result of the October meeting, Italy adhered to 
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the anti-Comintern Pact with Germany and Japan. On November 1, 1936, Mussolini made 
a speech at Milan in which he referred to a Berlin-Rome line as an "axis around which can 
revolve all those European states with a will to collaboration and peace".50 Within less than 
a year Mussolini accepted an invitation to visit Germany. While Mussolini had not overcome 
his dislike of Germany and the Germans, he was impressed with the German military might. 
The Fuhrer arranged a spectacular show of army maneuvers and armament. 
In May 1938, when Hitler returned his state visit to Italy, the German Foreign 
Minister Ribbentrop offered the Italians a military alliance. Mussolini refused it on the 
grounds of strong public opposition. Yet when Hitler seized Prague in March 193 9, 
Mussolini decided to invade Albania the following month. Neither action resulted in 
international repercussions. Thus when Ciano and Ribbentrop met in May 1939, the Italians 
were prepared to make an alliance. Mussolini, however, added a caveat that war should not 
be risked until 1942, because the Duce had planned an international exhibition in Rome to 
raise precious foreign currency. The Germans countered that since a defensive treaty was 
pointless, a Pact of Steel should be written: 
''If it should happen, against the wishes and hopes of the contracting parties, 
that one of them becomes involved in warlike complications with another 
Power or with other Powers, the other contracting party will come to its aid 
as an ally and will support it with all its military forces on land, on sea and in 
the air. "51 
Italy was now committed, giving Hitler carte blanche to attack Poland and to plunge 
into World War II. In August 1939 Ciano visited Hitler and was told the shocking news 
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that Germany intended to make war on Poland. Clearly, Italy wanted to abandon their 
commitments to the Germans rapidly, but that presented problems. Honor and the need to 
overcome the reputation as a faithless nation acquired in 1914-1915, were concerns. Italy 
managed to stay out of the war in 1939. In the spring of 1940, however, the war became 
real as the British cut off German coal shipments to Italy. If he did not join the battle Hitler 
might wreak vengeance and retake Trentino and Trieste. Mussolini was a bellicose 
nationalist. He wanted war, he glorified war. Now he had to fight. 
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CHAPTERS 
THE CALL TO ARMS 
WORLD WAR II 
In attempting to balance its foreign policy between the reality of economic 
dependence on German trade and the desire for maintaining traditional Allied ties, 
Yugoslavia managed to remain neutral for about sixteen months. For the moment it was 
in Germany's interest that Yugoslavia remain neutral because Hitler feared that Britain and 
France might open a front in the Balkans. As he was already secretly preparing to attack 
the Soviet Union, he was eager to have the Balkans as a peaceful hinterland; however, 
Mussolini's invasion of Greece on October 28, 1940, (of which he had not informed 
Hitler), complicated Germany's strategic plans. In early 1941 British troops disembarked 
in the Balkans. 1 
Hitler needed passage through Yugoslavia to support his efforts in the Greek 
theater, and in order to gain it he promised more economic aid to the Yugoslavs. The 
Belgrade coup caught both Hitler and Mussolini by surprise, but the Yugoslav-Soviet 
treaty of friendship was an act of treachery. Hitler promised that Yugoslavia would be 
exterminated. On April 6, 1941 a combined force of Germans, Italians, Hungarians and 
Romanians ruthlessly attacked Yugoslavia, and in eleven days, on April 17th, the 
Yugoslav Armed Forces capitulated.2 King Peter and his government had already gone 
into exile to London. 3 
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After the so-called "April War", Yugoslavia faced three fates--annexation, 
occupation, or in the case of Croatia, establishment of a semi-autonomous state. Most of 
the kingdom was annexed by adjacent nations.4 The Germans annexed the northern part of 
Slovenia, while Italy took the southern portion of Slovenia, including Lubiana and !stria, 
and Dalmatia.5 (Map 16). An "independent Croat nation" was further divided into 
German and Italian spheres of influence. The German military would have preferred 
outright occupation, but Hitler and his Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, saw some 
advantage in allowing Mussolini's client, the Ustasha leader, Ante Pavelic, to become a 
puppet Fuhrer. As the war progressed, however, German influence in Croatia gradually 
assumed greater authority than the Italians, and after the Italian collapse of 1943, their 
control was absolute. 6 
Occupation 
Hitler was very interested in controlling a large part of Yugoslav territory, including 
those areas of Slovenia and Croatia which were rich in strategic materials and the major rail 
trunk lines which provided rapid communication with the Balkans. Hitler also wanted to 
annex into the Reich areas inhabited by Germans or those amenable to speedy 
Germanization. 7 The German racial theorist, Alfred Rosenberg, contended that some 
Slovenes were not Slovenes at all, but Wends, a highly Germanized type of Slav. For 
practical purposes they were treated as German citizens and were recruited into militia-like 
Wehrmannschaft (Reserves). 8 
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For those not remotely German, Hitler intended to exterminate Slavic ethnic groups 
in order to implement his radical racial concept of Germanization. He declared initially that 
his objective was to populate the Slovene lands with people of"pure" German blood, to 
provide more Lebensraum. Therefore he began to cleanse the land of Slovenes through a 
planned system of mass deportation. On April 18, 1941, the Germans announced their plans. 
First, two hundred-sixty thousand Slovenes, or approximately forty per cent of the Slovene 
population under German occupation, were to be deported to Serbia or to Croatia for 
internment and second, about twenty to thirty thousand peasants were to be transported to 
Silesia (today's southern Poland) to work the farms and mines.9 While thousands were 
deported to Germany and Austria, many more fled to the Italian zone, where conditions were 
less rigorous. 10 
German plans of mass deportation of the Slovenes could not be implemented due to 
transport and to operational conditions. For those Slovenes who remained the Germans 
sought to deny them their rights as an ethnic group and subjected them to a brutal policy of 
Germanization. The use of the Slovene language was again banned in schools, and children 
were punished if they used their mother tongue. The Germans destroyed Slovene schools, 
tore down Slovene road signs and notices, changed place-names and even replaced epitaphs 
on gravestones. 
For the Italians, the rapid victory led to Italian occupation of a broad band of 
Slovene and Croat, as well as Montenegrin, territory. Italy thus acquired not only all the 
lands once demanded by Italian irredentists, but extended her territory and influence beyond 
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any frontiers dreamed in the nineteenth century. The Adriatic Sea could now properly be 
called mar nostrum. Italian fascists proudly asserted that Italy now followed in the footsteps 
of her Roman ancestors in building an empire. 11 They considered Rome a superior 
civilization compared to the barbarian societies of the Slavs and communists. 
The Italian military government, in order to pacify the newly aborbed parts of 
Slovenia, introduced the process of Italianization gradually, in contrast with the brutal 
enforcement that was exercised in Venezia-Giulia after World War I. Unlike the Germans 
in the north, the Italians recognized the existence of a separate Slovene ethnicity. Except in 
Venezia-Giulia, the Slovene language was given official status alongside Italian, and the 
University ofLubiana remained open. The Italian civilian authorities introduced signs in 
two languages everywhere, and permitted a Slovene press. The Italians also accepted the 
existence of Slovene and Croat schools and cultural organizations. 12 The Italians, however, 
did introduce a certain amount of economic exploitation, primarily by the establishment of 
state monopolies. 13 The occupying civil authority, the Commissariat, appointed fascist chiefs 
to govern local communities. Since the Church had great influence, particularly in the 
countryside, the Italians at first had little trouble with the population. 14 
Resistance 
The Axis occupation ultimately brought out both collaboration and resistance. Some 
groups were openly collaborationist. 15 Dr. Marko Natlachen, who had been Ban (Governor) 
ofDravska (Slovenia) before the occupation, organized a fascist militia, the Slovene Legion. 
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He saw himself as a patriot, realist and anti-communist. 16 In Croatia, the collaboration was 
even more extreme. Although the U stashas had their own private agenda of exterminating 
as many Serbs as they could, they unwittingly became a pawn of the German racists. 17 The 
U stashas planned to deal with their enemies in three ways: one third to be exterminated; 
one third to be deported, and one third to be converted to Catholicism. In the old military 
frontier districts, the Ustashas slaughtered thousands. 18 In the village of Glina, all male 
inhabitants were herded into the church, which was then burned down, while U stashas 
waited to shoot anyone who tried to escape. Such atrocities shocked even the German 
officers who witnessed the act. 19 The W ehrmacht (German Army) was anxious to avoid 
trouble in the Balkans. They feared that U stasha violence would provoke a reaction from 
the Serbs which might lead to civil war, requiring a greater presence of German forces to 
maintain supply lines. The Italians, however, continued their support of the Ustashas since 
they were suspicious of further German penetration into Croatia and Albania. 
At the time of the invasion, some Yugoslav army officers managed to hide out and 
refused to surrender. Among them was a general staff colonel, Draza Mihailovic. He was 
well known abroad, having attended higher general staff schools in Paris, where he became 
friends with Charles de Gaulle. On May 13, 1941, he left with twenty-six men for the remote 
area of Ravna Gora to build an underground movement to restore the monarchy. Until 
Allied combat support became available, he saw no point in provoking the Germans to 
savage reprisals against the civilian population by acts of sabotage or by isolated attacks on 
Germans. This was also the view of the British government at the time. 20 In October 1941 
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the British government, on advice from the exiled royal government in London, decided to 
recognize Mihailovic as the leader of the Yugoslav resistance movement. He gave the 
name "Chetnik" to this organization. 21 Mihailovic established radio contact with the exile 
government in London and received the message in October 1941, "Except in case of dire 
necessity, do not provoke the enemy until the signal is given for joint effort. "22 
At first, Allied propaganda inflated the image of Mihailovic into that of a legendary 
hero. It seems probable that the knowledge that he had the backing of the Allies and of the 
exiled government stiffened Mihailovic in his rejection of early proposals for military 
cooperation with the Partisans. The British liaison officers, Major Duane (Bill) Hudson and 
Colonel S. W. Bailey, asked for reconciliation of differences between the two groups; 
however the root of the differences was more profound. The Chetniks were mainly Serb 
and Royalists, thus favoring centralist tendencies. The Partisans represented a broad 
cross-section of Yugoslav peoples who favored social reform and release from Serb 
hegemony. 
Another resistance force in Slovenia was the combination of Liberals and Catholics, 
bitter enemies before the war, now united in an anti-communist Slovene Alliance. 23 There 
were also Slovene Chetniks, loosely attached to the Slovene Alliance, but they were 
considered as little or no threat to the Italians. 24 In fact the Italians attempted to exploit the 
Slovene Alliance and Chetnik anti-Communist feelings by organizing them into paramilitary 
''White Guards" to police the villages and '13lue Guards" to fight the Partisans. The Slovene 
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Chetniks were recruited from Yugoslav ex-officers who considered themselves to be acting 
on behalf of Mihailovic. ~ 
The Yugoslav Partisans, the other major resistance group, for all practical purposes 
were under the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party (PCJ). In its early years, the 
Communist Party had operated underground with limited success since police harassment and 
internal quarrels reduced it to impotence. 26 The old guard expected the proletariat to 
overcome regional differences to become a national party. For them ethnic and linguistic 
differences among Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were irrelevant. They did not even consider 
Slovene as an independent language. This bias of the Communist Party toward centralization 
went in a different direction from the other opposition parties which demanded greater 
autonomy. 27 
In its resolution of March 1935, however, the party's central committee reversed its 
centralist position and called for the federalist approach. The party became increasingly 
aware that nationalism was dangerous, since it played into the hands of the pro-fascist groups 
in Croatia and Slovenia. 28 In 193 7 the party formed regional communist parties in Croatia 
and Slovenia. 
The return of Josip Broz, also known as Tito, in 193 7 changed the destiny of the 
Yugoslav Communist Party. While in Moscow as a member of the Yugoslav Politburo, Tito 
worked for the Comintern and gained the confidence of Stalin. 29 At the end of 193 7, while 
his compatriots in Moscow perished in Stalin's purges, Tito managed to survive and become 
First Secretary of the Yugoslav Communist Party. Tito was a perfect conspirator and 
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organizer. He set to work early in 193 8 purging and reorganizing the Communist network 
throughout Yugoslavia and promoted his cohorts who were committed body and soul to the 
Soviet Union and to Stalin. Tito was very strongly influenced by Stalin's concept of a state 
that recognized regional cultural, historical and linguistic autonomy, yet one that retained a 
centralized political structure through the party.30 
By late 1941 the Italians in occupied Slovenia encountered the first armed resistance, 
in the form of terrorist attacks by the Partisans. The Italian military countered with their own 
wave of terrorism, including the taking of hostages and the burning of villages. These harsh 
actions were to little avail. At the beginning of 1942, the situation for the Italian high 
command in the provincial capital ofLubiana was delicate and grave.31 As Partisan terrorist 
activity against the Italians and native non-communists increased, the Governor, General 
Humberto Grazaioli, initiated more severe measures and issued a proclamation promising that 
repression of the guerrillas would be applied "without pity" since the "behavior of the 
Partisans toward Italian prisoners and wounded soldiers was contrary to all recognized rules 
of warfare. "32 The Italian occupation propaganda machine exploited incidents committed by 
Partisans against the local population. In July 1942, the Italians attempted to wipe out the 
Partisans in Slovenia by launching an offensive of seven divisions against them. Although the 
Partisans suffered severely, they managed to escape destruction. Some Partisans crossed over 
the borders into Italy to the cities of Gorizia, Trieste, Pola and even to Udine to exploit 
anti-fascist sentiment there and conducted joint operations with Italian Partisans. By the 
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autumn of 1942, Slovene Partisans claimed that they had "liberated one-third of territory" 
of the province. In fact, they controlled only the hilly, forested areas. Towns and cities were 
still controlled by the Italians at a cost of the commitment of six divisions. 
In the meantime, Partisan-Chetnik relations turned from bad to worse. At 
first, Mihailovic regarded the Partisans as dangerous fanatics, but assumed they were on the 
Yugoslav side. 33 Tito perceived that he had two enemies, the Germans and Italians, and the 
internal enemy, the anti-Communists, especially the Chetniks. The Chetniks, initially favored 
by the British, presented an obstacle for his future revolution. 
For the most part, Mihailovic' s Chetniks avoided aggressive campaigns against the 
Germans, a policy in accordance with his instructions from London, and the belief that the 
Allies would invade the Istrian peninsula after the invasion ofltaly. (See below). Mihailovic 
envisioned resistance in terms of setting up an organization which when the time was ripe 
would rise against the occupying forces. Such a time would come when Allied victory was 
assured and the liberation of Yugoslavia was imminent. 34 
Circumstances changed as the Allies wanted diversion of German and Italian forces 
from North Africa and from Sicily in late 1942. Mihailovic continued to restrain his actions 
and did not conduct major operations against the occupiers. Both of the British liaison 
officers, Major Hudson and Colonel Bailey, began criticizing the lack of activity. At the same 
time Tito was gaining prestige by his aggressive policy against the Germans and by favorable 
reports from his British liaison. 35 Gradually the Allies were fed information from the liaison 
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and from field intelligence quartered in Cairo that Mihailovic was doing little or nothing to 
fight the Germans; however, he was doing everything in his power to harass the Partisans. 36 
As Allied operational requirements increased, the Allies altered their policy. In late 1942 the 
British encouraged more aggressive action through joint organization and cooperation of both 
groups. 37 Tito, encouraged by the shift in policy, tried a tactic to control the Chetniks by 
proposing immediate, unlimited operations against the Germans by united Partisans and 
Chetnik forces under a unified command. Tito offered Mihailovic membership in the Partisan 
High Command, and military leadership of a combined force. The catch lay in the 
subordination of the military commander to the High Command as a whole, which was 
controlled by Tito himself 38 Mihailovic saw the trap and rejected it. 
Tito and Mihailovic not only had different ideological and personal motivations, but 
the two leaders also had different management styles: Tito was a superb organizer while 
Mihailovic lacked that talent altogether; Tito enforced discipline, Mihailovic could not 
control his subordinates; Tito's policies were dynamic, Mihailovic' s were basically static; Tito 
fought ruthlessly in pursuit of his ambitions, Mihailovic gambled all on his faith in an Allied 
victory while he and his followers sought to prevent the spread of the alien communist 
ideology . 39 
By early 1943, four Axis attacks pushed Tito's Partisans southward into Bosnia. The 
fifth Axis offensive, which lasted through May and June 1943, proved the Partisans' greatest 
military ordeal. Tito himself was wounded, but his forces succeeded in escaping into 
northeast Bosnia. The morale of the Partisans was unimpaired, however, and within the next 
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six months they recovered sufficiently to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by a 
sudden change in the fortunes of war--the capitulation of Fascist Italy. 
The Fall of Fascism 
The Axis troops in north Africa surrendered on May 13, 1943 and on July 9th, 
Allied troops landed in Sicily meeting little resistance. This successful Allied invasion of 
Sicily and the threat of invasion of the mainland, made many influential Italians nervous. 
Ivanoe Bonomi, the former Prime Minister, visited the king on June 2, 1943 and pointed out 
that if the king dismissed Mussolini, which he had constitutional right to do, the Axis alliance 
would no longer be valid, since the Pact of Steel was between two regimes, not between the 
two nations. 
On July 19, 1943 Hitler and Mussolini agreed that only drastic action could now save 
Italy. Hitler was determined to maintain Mussolini as the fascist figurehead. On July 24th, at 
Mussolini's call, the Fascist Grand Council met. The former fascist ras who had supported 
Mussolini in his rise to dictatorship, Dino Grandi, stated, '1he real enemy of fascism is the 
dictatorship. ''40 Mussolini seemed unable to defend himself The Council voted nineteen to 
seven for Grandi's motion to dismiss Mussolini as its chief The nervous Mussolini thought 
that he could convince Hitler to transfer troops to help defend his regime. It happened, 
however, that the king had prepared a plan to dismiss and to replace him with Marshal Pietro 
Badoglio. The next afternoon Mussolini visited the king and was not only dismissed, but 
arrested. With his arrest, Italian fascism began to dissolve. 
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Hitler could not accept the elimination of the sister fascist state. He therefore ordered 
the kidnapping of Mussolini from his internment and set up the neo-Fascist Republic of Salo', 
on the banks of Lake Garda.41 German troops streamed across the Brenner Pass and 
reinforced occupied northern and central Italy, as well as Rome. Hitler annexed the 
Brenner-South Tyrol area and the city of Trieste. 42 
The Italian capitulation at the beginning of September 1943 was the signal 
for a race between the Germans and the Partisans to accept the surrender of the Italian 
troops and take over their military equipment in Slovenia, Dalmatia and Montenegro. On 
September 9, 1943, the German military forces seized the Italian headquarters at Lubiana.43 
The Germans interned as many of the Italian forces in the area as possible, but a few Italian 
soldiers managed to escape. Outside the cities, many simply laid down their arms and 
surrendered, or they were assaulted by both Partisans and U stashas. 44 Large numbers of 
disillusioned Italian soldiers joined Partisan units (Garibaldi Brigades) as Tito's forces began 
to occupy Dalmatia and most of formerly Italian-held Slovenia41 The Italian surrender 
brought the collapse of both auxiliaries dependent on the Italians--the White and Blue 
Guards--as well as the demise of the Independent Croat State. 46 
The Germans successfully counterattacked the border areas taken up by the Partisans. 
Having regained these areas, the Germans established a Civil Commissariat with its seat in 
Trieste. Dr. Friedrich Rainer, the Gauleiter of Carinthia became the chief civil authority. 
Lower-level posts remained in the hands of loyal members of the local population. The 
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Commissariat named Bruno Coceani, a former fascist leader, as prefect (mayor) of Trieste. 
Coceani understood that the Germans would lose ultimately, and the real enemy after the war 
for Triestine Italians would be the Yugoslavs. 
To enlist greater cooperation of the local population, the Germans exploited 
Italo-Slavic animosities.47 They reversed their previous policy of ethnic suppression and 
recognized the existence and language rights of all ethnic groups.48 In Gorizia, Slovene 
newspapers started publication, and Slovene elementary and secondary schools opened and 
Slovenes were allowed to take over local administration. Such actions did not happen in 
Trieste, however, because of the strong Italian majority and pro-Italian policies of the local 
government. Coceani refused all Slovene demands.49 
Allied War Plans 
At Quebec in August 1943, President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill spoke about the possibility of a diversionary landing in Istria. Churchill proposed a 
"right-handed" flanking movement against Germany by "inflicting a stab in the Adriatic 
armpit"50 He justified the scheme on military grounds, but confirmed in his memoirs that 
another reason was the threat of rapid Russian encroachment into the Balkan Peninsula and 
the already dangerous spread of Soviet influence there. It was agreed at Quebec to keep open 
the "Istrian option", but only to act on it if the current Allied offensive in Italy resulted in a 
significant German retreat. That offensive, however, became bogged down in the following 
weeks. 
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Churchill's Istrian diversion came up again in December 1943 when the Supreme 
Allied Commander, General Dwight Eisenhower, envisioned that if he could get far enough 
north in Italy he could push northeast toward Austria. The American Chief of Staff, General 
George C. Marshall, instead advocated an advance west toward southern France. Either one 
of those movements would hold several German divisions. Roosevelt agreed with Churchill's 
idea that the introduction of small groups of commandos operating along the Adriatic coast 
had great possibilities as a diversionary action, but Marshall questioned whether operations in 
both France and Istria would be feasible since they might conflict with planned operations in 
Italy.51 This issue again arose in June 1944. Field Marshal Harold Alexander's Allied armies 
had driven north of Rome toward the Gothic Line between Pisa and Rimini. The strategists 
had to decide whether to breach the Gothic Line with all available forces or to withdraw some 
troops for planned landings elsewhere. On June 14th the Combined Chiefs of Staff decided to 
halt at the Gothic Line and to make three divisions available for landings in France. 
While Mihailovic looked forward to an Istrian landing, Tito feared one. In 1944 Tito 
secretly visited Moscow where he repeated his intention of using force, if necessary, to 
prevent Allied intervention in !stria. The Partisans' dread of a landing was confirmed by 
Tito's Slovene deputy, Edvard Kardelj, who wrote in his reminiscences that Tito had 
suspected that western troops might invade Istria and occupy the Isonzo River valley in its 
advance toward Vienna, thus challenging Yugoslav claims to the territory. 52 Because of 
insufficient transport and logistics to support both the French and the Istrian landings, 
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Churchill finally had to drop the idea of a landing in Yugoslavia. 53 The dream of an Allied 
invasion that Mihailovic had long nurtured, faded (as did his fortunes). 
The showdown for support of the Chetniks came in early 1944. Before leaving for 
the Teheran Conference, Churchill received exaggerated reports about Partisan strength and 
capabilities. These reports convinced Churchill that the Partisans had been the only resistance 
force seriously fighting the Germans, and that the Partisans enjoyed overwhelming support of 
the Yugoslav people. 54 Churchill decided that all guerrilla forces should unite against the 
Germans and that Tito's Partisans were best prepared to lead the joint effort. He asserted that 
a united Yugoslav front of both Partisan and Chetnik forces under aggressive leadership 
would give the royal Yugoslav government an opportunity to determine the future of 
Yugoslavia. At the same time Stalin urged the Yugoslav Communists to compromise with 
Britain and avoid anything that might alarm the Anglo-Americans into thinking that the 
Partisans had a revolutionary agenda. 
Upon his return from Teheran, Churchill pressured King Peter to recognize 
a joint Partisan-Chetnik force under the king's direct command, even at the price of sacrificing 
Mihailovic himself Accordingly, King Peter appointed the former Ban (Governor) of Croatia, 
Dr. Ivan Subasic, as his Prime Minister. Churchill hastened to secure the monarchy's position 
by sending his son, Randolph, to Partisan territory to persuade Tito to accept the proposal. 
Tito asked for a compromise in which the king could return to power, but not until after the 
war, and that a regency of Subasic in London and Tito in the field would govern in the 
interim. This compromise was accepted by Churchill. 
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From then on the Partisans, backed by the increasing weight of Allied support, 
gradually pushed the Germans back. In September 1944, the Red Army reached the Yugoslav 
border, and Tito was detennined to meet Stalin to discuss the conditions for the passage of 
the Red Army before it entered the country. He secretly flew to Moscow where he reached 
an agreement which pennitted the passage of Soviet troops through Yugoslav territory in 
return for Stalin's pledge that the Red Army would not interfere with the Yugoslav civil 
administration. The Red Army entered Yugoslavia on October I st and on October 20th a 
joint Partisan-Red Army force entered Belgrade.ss 
Slovenia and lstria 
In Venezia-Giulia several resistance groups contended for power during 
the war: 1. the Slovene Partisans, also known as the Slovene Liberation Front, which 
consisted of Slovene Communists who sought some post-war regional autonomy within the 
Yugoslav state; 2. the Yugoslav Partisans, who operated under the general direction of Tito 
and the Yugoslav Communist Party (PCJ) who sought a unified Yugoslavia under the PCJ; 
3. the Italian Communists in Venezia-Giulia, who tended to follow the better organized 
Slovene Partisans; 4. the Italian Communists (PCI) which directed most Italian Partisan 
activities, who sought a post-war left wing victory in Italian national politics; and 5. various 
non-Communist resistance groups. s6 
The two Communist parties (PCJ and PCI) contrasted most sharply in 
Venezia-Giulia, Friuli and lstria. Although urban workers were initially united in the socialist 
movement prior to World War I and subsequently united in the underground communist 
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movement during the thirties, each ethnic group formed its own small, but militant Slovene 
communist party (KPS and the local PCI). The two parties existed side-by-side, but 
separately. As the Second World War progressed and as the resistance grew stronger, the 
Yugoslav Partisans demonstrated a successful model for both Italian and Slovene resistance. 
In 1943, it was agreed that the Italians could form their own Partisan units and operate under 
Slovene Partisan command. 
The Italians were able to organize armed resistance on a large scale only after the 
collapse of Mussolini's regime in the summer of 1943. The surrender of the Italians in 
September 1943, however, accentuated the differences in scale and competence of the rival 
forces. The surrendering Italian troops in Yugoslavia created a vacuum which the Yugoslav 
Partisans were quick to fill. The Partisans benefited by closer proximity to the rapidly 
disintegrating Italian forces. Within three weeks after the Italian surrender the Partisans 
could form large military formations of corps and divisions. 
The Slovene Partisans had waged active guerrilla operations since the beginning of 
the war. They had the advantage of terrain. Slovenia was mainly rural and contained hills 
and forests which provided excellent cover for guerrilla bands. The chief elements of the 
resistance were communist Partisans, led by Edvard Kardelj and Boris Kidric. The other 
elements were left-wing members of the ethnic Sokols (recall that Sokols were cultural and 
gymnastic organizations disbanded by the Yugoslav dictatorship in the 193 Os), some 
Christian Socialists, as well as some parish priests, and radically-minded writers and 
intellectuals. 57 
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During the first year of Italian occupation ( 1941) the leaders of the traditional Slovene 
political parties did not join resistance movements. In fact, they condemned the Partisans' 
terrorist activities for provoking Italian reprisals. The Partisans answered with a series of 
terrorist attacks against well-known anti-communist figures. The conservative forces reacted 
violently against the Partisans and joined in open collaboration with the Italians. In a similar 
vein the Trieste Italian and Slovene Communists formed their own urban guerrillas, 
Gruppo di Azione Patriotica, which conducted terrorist operations against German and Italian 
garrisons and killed prominent anti-Communists. These actions provoked the occupation 
forces to inflict fierce reprisals on the general populace in both rural and urban areas, further 
alienating ordinary Italians and Slovenes. The Slovene Partisans at first had little success 
among the peasants. Nevertheless, the increased number and degree of reprisals by the 
occupying forces changed the normally conservative people's attitude. After a few months of 
propaganda, the Slovene Liberation Front, directed by the Partisans, had enough members to 
assemble its first small armed bands . .ss 
The Italians who joined the Partisan movement in Venezia-Giulia came from the 
industrial centers along the coast {Trieste and Monfalcone) and from Friuli and 
Gorizia/Gradisca. In early 1943 the Italians and Slovenes discussed the possibility of uniting 
into a single military unit, to be called the Garibaldi detachment (later renamed the Garibaldi 
Brigade). The workers from Monfalcone, true to their traditional combativeness, mobilized 
spontaneously and fought alongside Slovene formations during the liberation of Gorizia in 
September 1943 . .s9 At the same time, the workers from the Trieste area had formed their 
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first proletarian brigade, later to be renamed the Triestina Brigade, which fought with the 
Slovene Partisans operating in Venezia-Giulia. 60 Soon after, there followed other Garibaldi 
Brigades, and finally the Garibaldi Division and the Natisone Division (named after the 
Natisone River Valley in Friuli), which operated in Friuli and Slovenia. 61 The Italian Socialists 
formed their own Osoppo Division, which also operated in Friuli. 
Italian liberal-democrats of y enezia-Giulia who opposed both fascism and German 
occupation established their own political underground, the Committee for National 
Liberation (CLN), in Venezia-Giulia, Friuli and in Trieste. Although it did agree to cooperate 
with the Slovene Liberation Front, the CLN was very much concerned about keeping its 
identity as Italian. The CLN objected to the ethnic principle of self-determination for the 
drawing of borders. It did not recognize the Slavs' right to annex all territories compactly 
settled by Slavs and it made it clear that the entire Venezia-Giulia area should remain united 
with Italy .62 
The local PCI leader in Trieste, Luigi Frausin, tended to support the CLN position, 
but after his arrest the local Slovene Communist Party (KPS) sought an Italian Communist 
representative who would cooperate more closely with them.63 Obligingly Frausin's successor 
demanded that the CLN agree to unification of Venezia-Giulia with the new democratic 
Yugoslavia. The CLN rejected this condition, and as a result the Italian Communists 
abandoned cooperation with the CLN. Thereafter, the CLN took a strong position, stating 
that the Italian democratic parties would defend the old Italian frontier; however, they 
promised cultural autonomy for the Slovene and Croat minorities. 64 
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Yugoslav aid was of critical importance in the creation of the Italian resistance units, 
and cooperation between Italian and Yugoslav Partisans was common at first. As soon as 
substantial Italian Partisan formations emerged, conflict and misunderstandings between the 
two groups began to appear. The Yugoslav Partisan commands wanted to maintain control. 
To assert its control, the Trieste PCI pulled an Italian Partisan battalion away from a Croat 
division control in !stria and moved it into the city to support a strike in the shipyards. 65 
PCI-KPS relations in Friuli and Venezia-Giulia proved even more difficult, in part because 
the Italian formations in the area were relatively strong. In early 1944, the Slovene Partisans 
asked that Italian units move to the west of the Tagliamento River (Map 16) leaving the area 
to the east (including Gorizia, Udine, and Trieste) to Slovene control. The Italians refused; 
they knew that the area figured prominently in Slovene territorial aspirations. The Yugoslavs 
moderated their territorial demands, but they increased Slovene nationalist propaganda to 
such an extent that Italian Communist Partisans again protested in August 1944. Across the 
border in Slovene operational zones Slovene commanders sought to discourage Italian 
recruitment. The KPS political commissar ordered the Italians to release all the Slavs from the 
Garibaldi and Natisone Divisions and to expel "types who had stained themselves with Fascist 
cruelty against the Slovene nation. "66 Many recent Italian recruits were transferred to the 
interior of Slovenia where they were used only as labor forces rather than as combatants. The 
Italian Partisan Natisone Division most consistently opposed Yugoslav efforts to establish 
hegemony over them. In March 1945, its leaders attempted to ensure that Italian units would 
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participate in the liberation of Trieste and Gorizia, but by April, the Yugoslav Partisans 
moved the division far from Trieste, to liberate Lubiana. The rivalry among Italian, Slovene 
and Yugoslav communists made a mockery of Marxist internationalism. Each party had their 
own nationalist aspirations. 
In Trieste by August 1944, the KPS established a strong base of Italo-Slovene 
workers' organizations, and succeeded in mass mobilization of the workers. The KPS 
galvanized worker committees to call for the annexation of Trieste to Yugoslavia. The 
national PCI argued that such calls would make the Italian population unlikely to support the 
Yugoslav movement, and that it would compromise efforts to create an anti-Nazi front. 
Francesco Leone of the PCI reached an agreement with the KPS which declared that it was 
impossible to discuss the border issues at that time, but both Italian and Yugoslav national 
rights were to be recognized.67 Later, in August of 1944, Palmira Togliatti, the leader of the 
national PCI pulled a svolta (about-face). He claimed that the Italian liberation movement in 
Friuli and Venezia-Giulia was strengthened by the presence of Yugoslav Partisans.68 Later 
that month Luigi Longo, one of the top national leaders of the PCI, stated that the Slovene 
Communists could mobilize the population of Venezia-Giulia in upholding its right to form 
an independent state federated with other Slavic states. The PCI would concentrate on the 
elimination of fascism in Friuli and in the Veneta. 
During the final months of the war in early 1945, however, the PCI was no longer so 
anxious to leave Trieste to Yugoslavia. The pragmatic Togliatti, seeing an opportunity to 
form a coalition with the left wing Socialists and Social Democrats in a future post-war 
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government, understood the strong Italian sentiment for Trieste, and recalled that exasperated 
Italian nationalism over terra irredenta and the rise of extreme right wing of fascism had been 
closely linked in 1919. The local Triestine Communist newspaper, Rinascitau, published the 
PCI' s programmatic statement on Trieste. According to this statement, nationalism on both 
sides would perpetuate discord and present no economic advantages, for the city's economic 
hinterland lay not in Yugoslavia, but in Central Europe. The PCI argued for wide autonomy 
for the enlarged province of Venezia-Giulia, which included Fiume.69 By the spring of 1945, 
the PCI had become less willing to follow the PCJ' s lead. The PCI would not stand for 
Yugoslav annexation. 
The Allied Military Government 
From 1942 on, the allies developed plans for military occupation and 
transition after hostilities. Although the British view of Yugoslavia was often ambivalent, 
Churchill realized that Britain would have to accommodate itself to a significantly altered 
postwar balance of power. In October 1944 Churchill and Stalin concluded their famous 
fifty-fifty sphere of influence agreement. This agreement conceded to the British an equal 
share of influence in Yugoslavia, thereby enhancing British aspirations in the Balkans. This 
action, however, ran counter to the American position which rejected the setting up of 
spheres of influence. Friction between Britain and the United States had long been evident 
and reflected differing assumptions about the desired character of the postwar world. Hoping 
to ensure renewed influence in the Mediterranean after the war, the British sought to treat 
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Italy as a vanquished nation as long as possible, using the monarch to realign domestic 
political life along conservative lines. The United States was interested primarily in the rapid 
democratic rehabilitation of Italy as a viable partner in a new liberal world order. 70 
This general disparity in British and American policies was reflected in their respective 
approaches to Venezia-Giulia. The Americans still intended to establish an Allied Military 
Government (AMG) in Venezia-Giulia for the short term. By contrast, the British now 
considered a local compromise with Tito that would square with the sphere of influence 
agreements reached in Moscow. Given that the Partisans were already operating in !stria, 
the Combined Chiefs of Staff feared that Tito's men might succeed in establishing control in 
Venezia-Giulia. In October 1944 the staff advised that it would eventually be necessary to 
reach some agreement with Marshal Tito about the establishment of the AMG. Their view 
was reinforced by reports from Allied field missions with Tito's Partisans in Slovenia and 
Venezia-Giulia that the Yugoslavs intended to seize the area and that the Partisans were 
increasingly hostile toward Britain and the United States. 71 
When the Allied Commander for the Mediterranean, Field Marshal Alexander, went 
to Belgrade in February 1945, he offered to provide Allied troops to accelerate the German 
retreat from Yugoslavia, but Tito adamantly refused. Alexander also told Tito that it would be 
necessary to establish AMG control throughout Venezia-Giulia to protect the lines of 
communication between Trieste and Austria. He stated the AMG would exercise control of 
the area within the 193 9 frontiers and explained that this action would not prejudice boundary 
considerations in the final peace settlement.n The Yugoslav leader accepted the AMG, where 
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necessary for operational purposes, but only if Yugoslav civil administration already 
established by his Partisans was recognized. 
In early 1945 British Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, accommodated Tito's 
caveats and formally proposed at Yalta a demarcation line that satisfied Allied military 
requirements by leaving Trieste and the lines of communication to Austria under AMG 
control, while assigning the rest of the region to Yugoslav military administration. Churchill 
disagreed with this proposal for he had given up hope of retaining British influence over Tito 
and saw no reason to accommodate the Yugoslavs. In a letter to Eden on March 11, 1945 
he wrote, ''My feeling is that henceforth our inclination should be to back Italy against 
Tito.---I have lost my relish for Yugoslavia---On the other hand, I hope we may still save Italy 
from the Bolshevik pestilence. "73 A few days later the Prime Minister proposed to his Cabinet 
that he would inform Roosevelt that the British were disposed towards Italy in the northern 
Adriatic. Eden sought to persuade Churchill that Britain might still be able to influence the 
Yugoslav situation and should not write off Tito. Such action would cause anti-British feeling 
among the Slavs and would force Tito to depend upon the Russians. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt displayed little interest in Italic-Yugoslav border issues as he 
was most concerned with the defeat of Germany. Roosevelt died in March 1945, and Hany 
S. Truman became president of the United States. The State Department reported to 
President Truman that Venezia-Giulia was one of its gravest concerns, aside from Italy's 
economic distress, and that it was necessary to forestall Yugoslav occupation of an important 
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part of northeastern Italy. Truman treated the issue cautiously, but was eventually convinced 
that the United States should at least prevent Yugoslav control of Trieste. 74 
By March of 1945, Tito had concluded that the Anglo-Americans would not sanction 
Yugoslav occupation of the disputed territories, especially the predominantly Italian localities. 
Yet the Yugoslavs were convinced that they could best assure postwar possession by 
preemptive armed occupation. Tito needed to prepare for this occupation through Yugoslav 
operational control of the Italian resistance movement in northeastern Italy. This objective 
was partially attained when Italian Partisan divisions came under the command of Tito's corps 
in Friuli and parts of Venezia-Giulia. The other element of Tito's strategy was to postpone the 
liberation of other parts of Yugoslavia, i.e. Lubiana, in order to capture the disputed 
territories and present the British and Americans with a fait accompli. On March 1945, the 
Yugoslav Fourth Army began an offensive drive from Dalmatia. Its ultimate objective was 
Trieste. 75 By April 1945 Fiume and most of !stria had been "liberated" and the German 
garrison in Trieste was surrounded. Despite the meetings between Tito and Field Marshal 
Alexander in February, the interested parties misunderstood the status of Venezia-Giulia upon 
liberation. The Yugoslavs expected to occupy the whole area, including Trieste. The Italians 
hoped that they could retain the 1939 frontiers, but the Anglo-Americans were mainly 
interested in the immediate military situation. 76 
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CHAPTER6 
THE TRIESTE QUESTION 
Near the end of the war Trieste emerged as one of the most contentious issues facing 
the former Allies. The Yugoslavs desired to retain Trieste and Venezia-Giulia which had 
been "liberated" by their forces. The Anglo-Americans wished to establish an interim Allied 
Military Government in the disputed area to aid in maintaining lines of communications 
required to pursue retreating German forces. The British and Americans also sought to 
prevent further Communist encroachment to the west. The interim administration lasted for 
more than nine years. The original misunderstanding and conflict between Allied and 
Yugoslav goals remained unresolved. The Trieste question became not just a border issue, 
but it became a pawn in the greater game of the Cold War. 
When Field Marshal Alexander met Tito in Belgrade in February 1945, the question 
of the administration of Venezia-Giulia had become urgent, yet no clear agreement appeared 
to have been reached. Tito assumed that the Allies would accept a fait accompli and that 
Alexander was interested only in safeguarding his supply lines from Trieste northwards to 
Tarvisio and southern Austria. He offered the use of the port at Trieste and even the use of 
the Sudbahn rail line via Lubiana. It seemed that control of Trieste would rest with 
whomever got there first. 1 
By April 27, 1945 Tito's forces were twenty-five miles from Trieste while the closest 
British or American troops were in the vicinity of Venice, one-hundred-twenty miles away. 
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A race for Trieste was about to begin. During the next week military developments in Italy 
moved at lightning speed. Occupation plans could no longer be discussed at leisure. As the 
Yugoslavs neared Trieste, Anglo-American policy makers had to confront directly the 
unresolved question of how to handle Yugoslav resistance to the AMG in Venezia-Giulia. 
The areas of Trieste, Pola, and the lines of communication to Austria were critical. The rest 
of Venezia-Giulia could be left to the Yugoslavs. Churchill cabled Truman that Alexander 
should be ordered to make a dash for Trieste: ''The late president always attached great 
importance to Trieste, ---the great thing is to be there before Tito's guerrillas are in 
occupation. "2 
Near the end of April 1945, when the evidence began to mount that the war in Europe 
was almost over, seven distinct groups in Trieste carefully watched events, preparing for the 
day and adopting positions to best achieve their goals. The contenders were: 1. the 
Republican Fascists, those few former fascists (numbering about 15,000) in Trieste supported 
the Prefect (Mayor) Coceani; 2. the Comitato di Liberazione (CLN), those anti-Communist 
groups of Liberals, Socialists and Italian Nationalists (numbering about 25,000), who along 
with Coceani supported the Italian irredentist tradition; 3. Tito's Partisans organized in large 
military fronts (over 300,000 in numbers, but only 75,000 in combat formations, converging 
on !stria and Trieste), under the Yugoslav Communist Party's (PCJ) centralized control; 
4. the Italian Communists in the city of Trieste (mainly 15,000 industrial workers), unified 
with the Slovene Communists in favor of Yugoslav annexation of Venezia-Giulia; 5. the 
national Italian Communist Party (PCI), limited in numbers in Venezia-Giulia, but strong 
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throughout the entire peninsula (the PCI initially followed an internationalist agenda but it 
increasingly became nationalist in orientation since such a position favored the party in 
national politics); 6. the anti-Communist Slovenes, small in number, but composed of 
influential intellectuals; and 7. the Slovene Communists (also called the Slovenian Liberation 
Front) who desired annexation of Venezia-Giulia by Yugoslavia, but under regional 
autonomy.3 Despite internal differences, all Italian groups, except the local communists, 
conceded their first duty to be defense of Italy's eastern border against Slavic occupation. 
Against this bloc was arrayed the Slovene Liberation Front, with the local Italian Communists 
and the Yugoslav Partisans, whose main objective was to annex Trieste and the whole of 
Venezia-Giulia to the new communist Yugoslavia. 
The fascist administrators in occupied Yugoslavia had already retreated with German 
SS-Waffen and police forces beyond the Isonzo River. Some fascists remained and turned 
their weapons over to the CLN. Coceani spoke of the glorious Italian irredentist tradition, 
''Today, when once more they [Slovenes] try to impair our nationality, we must be one single 
idea, one single soul, an Italian bloc." Coceani considered local attacks against the Germans 
in Trieste would play into the hands of the Slavs. He sought to bargain with the Germans so 
that if the Germans turned over control to the CLN, the Italians could prevent damage to the 
port and city and join to forestall Yugoslav occupation.4 Events did not proceed successfully 
in this way, however. There were clashes between Germans and Triestines. On April 27 
SS-Waffen General Wilhelm Schaffer, informed the Italians he was instituting strict laws 
against unauthorized public assemblies and that he intended to defend the city to the last. 
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Meanwhile, the Yugoslav Partisan chiefs seeking cooperation from the CLN asked 
the CLN leaders what they wanted in exchange. The CLN replied that Venezia-Giulia, 
including Fiume and the islands, should be administered jointly by both Slavs and Italians. 
Pending acceptance, the CLN agreed to postpone its planned insurrection, but no agreement 
was reached nor did it appear that any agreement would come about. The CLN decided to 
begin its own uprising in the last days of April. The plans were doomed. 5 A German-Croat 
flotilla rushed to support the German forces, and the CLN found itself fighting along with 
local Partisans. The CLN began the uprising but could not master the entire city. It 
dominated only the very center while Yugoslav troops took up positions in the suburbs.6 
The strength of the pro-Communists in Trieste lay in the Slovene Liberation Front 
and Unita' Operaia, the syndicate of industrial unions. The first represented the Slovenes 
living in Trieste's suburbs, and the second represented the laborers in the factories of Trieste, 
both Slovene and Italian. The Slovene communists convinced the workers that the new 
Yugoslavia would be a workers' state, while Italy would probably remain capitalistic, 
controlled by the Western powers. The Trieste Italian workers responded positively to these 
arguments, since they had, in fact, never been comfortable with Italy. After the First World 
War the fascists began to harass them and suppressed the socialist and communist 
movements. 7 Despite the promise of prosperity under Italian control, industry and commerce 
in the city declined in part due to loss of trade with central Europe and in part to Italian 
favoritism toward other ports. 
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On April 29 and 30, the Yugoslav forces tried hard to break through the outer 
defenses of Trieste. By the evening of April 30, they penetrated the German positions and 
entered the first suburban villages. About 9:30, the next morning, May 1, the first armed 
Yugoslav units reached the city center. A few Chetniks, operating in the area, and the 
Slovene National Guard retreated toward the west, crossing the Isonzo on April 29. Here 
they surrendered to the British Eighth Army.8 Many members of the Blue and White Guard, 
however, were taken prisoners by Tito's troops and the majority were put to death.9 
The Partisans arrived in Trieste on the first of May, while elements of the Second 
New Zealand Division of the British Eighth Army crossed the Isonzo. Overcoming scattered 
German resistance, the New Zealanders encountered Yugoslav Partisan forces in 
Monfalcone, about twelve miles from Trieste. Surprised by the rapidity of the final 
Anglo-American advance, Yugoslav field officers sought to delay the New Zealand force in 
Monfalcone. The New Zealand commander, General Bernard Freyberg, knew that the battle 
for Trieste was not over and ordered his division to resume its advance toward that city as 
stipulated in Alexander's instructions. The New Zealanders soon encountered overt 
Yugoslav hostility. General Freyberg found himself confronted with a menacing demand 
from the chief of staff of the Fourth Yugoslav Army, General Pavle Jaksic: "We request 
Allied troops immediately to withdraw to the west bank of the Isonzo and that Allied Military 
authorities do not mix in our internal affairs . . . " 10 Prudently, Freyberg sought further 
instructions from his superiors in Naples. Freyberg asked to meet the Yugoslav Ninth Corps 
commander, but the Yugoslav failed to appear, so Freyberg ordered his troops to proceed to 
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Trieste. Soon thereafter the Yugoslav commander arrived and Freyberg explained that his 
orders were to press on to Trieste and open the port as a base for the British armies and his 
New Zealanders were already on the march. The German garrison resisted vigorously and 
the fighting did not end until May 2 when the New Zealanders entered the city. As a result, 
some of the Germans surrendered to Yugoslavs while others gave themselves up to New 
Zealanders. 
On a higher level, on May 3, Alexander received a message from Tito protesting that: 
"Allied Forces, which are under your command, without any previous notice have entered 
Trieste, Gorizia and Monfalcone, the cities which have been liberated by the Yugoslav 
Army". 11 Alexander smoothly replied that the overlapping of zones need not cause serious 
difficulties and restated his intention to establish the necessary organization in Trieste and 
elsewhere in the AMG area to ensure that his line of communication be brought into 
operation rapidly. 12 The "race" for Trieste ended somewhat ambiguously. 
The Forty Days 
When dawn broke on May 3, 1945, Trieste found itself under an uneasy dual 
occupation. The fortunes of war had brought two very different liberating armies to the area 
at the same time. Each force had been charged by its superiors with the responsibility of 
establishing a military government. Not surprisingly, relations were tense and confused. 
Partly as a consequence of ambiguous and poorly integrated Anglo-American wartime 
policies on Venezia-Giulia, it now became a matter of direct political-military confrontation. 
The Yugoslavs had ethnic claims to the Istrian peninsula, which they asserted 
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had been unfairly restored to Italy at the end of the First World War. The Italians, especially 
those living in the urban areas insisted on Italian retention of the area. Such opposing views 
were reflected by their responses to newly arrived Anglo-American forces . 
Major Geoffrey Cox was intelligence officer with the New Zealand Division which 
entered Trieste in 1945. His impressions were that the Italians along the way from Venice to 
Monfalcone were friendly, but upon reaching Monfalcone, there were many Yugoslav 
Partisans, unfriendly and even hostile to the W estemers. 13 He sensed a distrust and suspicion 
which would dominate the Cold War years. He wrote, · 
''Then, swiftly, we entered what the drivers rapidly enough called 
'Tito land' . There were Partisans everywhere---Suddenly we were 
at the Isonzo, and twenty minutes later we entered the outskirts of 
Monfalcone. By the roadside they were posting up portraits of 
Tito, and writing 'zivio (viva) Tito' and 'zivio Stalin'." 14 
Monfalcone had been liberated from Nazi occupation by the Partisans who also had 
already installed a Slovene mayor under the auspices of a local Committee of Liberation. Yet, 
as Cox passed down the road to Trieste, he witnessed other signs in Italian, "Viva Churchill" 
and "Viva Gli Alleati" and a more friendly atmosphere. He had crossed a ''No-Man's 
Land".15 
On the morning of May 3, Yugoslav General Josip Cerni assumed the position of 
military commander of Trieste, charged with the responsibility of organizing the military 
administration. One of his first acts was to issue a decree informing the public that the 
Yugoslav army had taken over administration of Trieste. While celebrating the fruits of 
victory, however, the newly arrived Yugoslavs became disorderly, threatening Italians. 
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Italian businessmen, clerics and former civil authorities were arrested. Summary arrests were 
carried out and people removed from the city without trial. The Yugoslavs' next move 
would have been their most important, had it been successful. They again tried to get the 
Allied troops out of Venezia-Giulia. The Yugoslav Nineteenth Corps commander, General 
Peter Drapsin, demanded that all Allied liaison officers and military missions be immediately 
withdrawn or "drastic action would be taken". 16 Freyberg informed Drapsin that the question 
of the garrison of Trieste was being discussed between Alexander and Tito, and that the 
British would ensure that no trouble broke out from their side. General Drapsin backed down 
from his threat and proceeded to visit General John Harding, Commander of the Thirteenth 
British Corps, on May 5, and the two agreed that Allied forces could remain in Trieste and 
along the roads connecting Trieste with Austria via Monfalcone and Gorizia. This 
agreement remained in force for five weeks while negotiations were held on higher levels. 
During this time an American and a British division joined the New Zealanders in securing 
the roads. 17 
Within a few days two headquarters had been set up, one by the Allied Military 
Government at the docks and railheads, and the other, by the Yugoslav Army in the 
administration of the city. 18 On May 5, the Yugoslavs assumed civil power in Trieste, 
installing a Croat Mayor who did not speak Slovene. Clocks in Trieste were advanced one 
hour to match the time in Belgrade, a curfew was imposed, and all unauthorized public 
assemblies were outlawed. 19 
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Many Italians feared for their future rights and citizenship. Except for a few 
workers, Italians did not participate in legal organized demonstrations in support of the 
Partisans. The shopkeepers, intellectuals, teachers, professors, engineers, and middle-class 
in general favored annexation by Italy. Particularly disillusioned were members of the Italian 
Communist Party of Trieste, since they had cooperated significantly with the Yugoslavs in 
securing control of the city from the Germans and they now found themselves ignored. The 
urbanized Italian Communists witnessed their city "invaded by people from the hills" (the 
country people or, plainly speaking, the Slav peasants). On May 7, the Yugoslavs created the 
Consiglio di Liberazione di Trieste (Council for the Liberation ofTrieste-CLT), which gave 
the Slovene Communist Party full administrative control over the Communist movement in 
Trieste. 
After taking Trieste, the Partisans continued to "liberate" the rest of Slovenia. The 
Slovene non-communists organized a 'Slovene Alliance' in Lubiana on May 3, 1945. The 
Alliance called a meeting of former Slovene deputies to the prewar Belgrade Parliament as 
well as cultural and economic leaders to form an underground Slovene parliament and to 
proclaim a United Slovenia, which would be a member of a federated Yugoslavia with King 
Peter as ruler. Before they could implement their plans, Partisan forces had encircled the 
city. The Alliance members along with other non-communist resistance fighters managed to 
escape to the north and surrendered to the British. The British held them in detention briefly, 
but then turned them over to the new Yugoslav rulers, who massacred them in the Kocevje 
Forest of Slovenia. 20 
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At the war's end there was much tension between Italians and Slavs. In Trieste, 
hatred was fueled by the ideological division of the population into communists and 
anti-communists, and by the history ofltalian Fascist policy against Slovenes. During this 
time many non-communist Italians disappeared as a result of long-built up acrimony and 
hatred against the fascists. It was alleged that that those who had disappeared had been 
buried in foibe (deep holes or caverns in the limestone shield of the Carso). An Allied 
Committee investigating complaints in late 1945 found that there was evidence that many 
persons were indeed thrown into the foibe. An independent study conducted in 1995 
revealed that over five thousand police, former fascists, soldiers and collaborators 
disappeared without a trace. 21 The Slavs of Venezia-Giulia could not forget the harsh realities 
of the Italian Fascist regime which had ruled for more than two decades and had maintained 
an attitude of racial and cultural superiority against Slavs. 
As stated above, the communist dominated CL T had assumed civil authority in 
Trieste. The communist controlled unions and Slovene Liberation Front called public 
electoral meetings which resulted in the election of an assembly with eighty-two Italians and 
thirty-seven Slovenes, mostly selected by the CL T. The assembly elected a Liberation 
Council which would assume the role as executive to the assembly. The new Liberation 
Council consisted of eighteen members, eleven Italians and seven Slovenes, all born or 
resident in Trieste. 22 Only four percent of the population participated in the election process 
with no secret ballot. 23 
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The people's courts, militia and unions provided the usual Communist tools to keep 
the people under control. The Special People's Court condemned fascists and their 
collaborators to death and imprisonment. To help detect former fascists, the branches of the 
labor unions organized purging commissions. Anyone seeking employment had to belong to 
the union. Persons known for anti-communist sentiments in the past were denied 
membership and could not get employment. 24 What happened in Trieste and in the rest of 
Venezia-Giulia was an integral part of Yugoslav events. It was a successful conclusion to a 
communist revolution. Those who did not collaborate with the communists and opposed 
their takeover were regarded as enemies. Italians, Slovenes and Croats who opposed 
communist rule for whatever reason were proclaimed fascists and persecuted. 
On May 12, 1945 the disputed lands of Venezia-Giulia were temporarily divided into 
two provinces. The first province included the territory of Gorizia/Gradisca, as well as 
Tarvisio, and parts ofFriuli. The second province included the environs of Trieste, while 
Trieste itself became an autonomous city. To the south, !stria was divided into eight 
districts and the autonomous city of Pola. Fiume became an autonomous city directly under 
control of the Yugoslav military administration. There was no true local government, for in 
Trieste the Council reported directly to the Slovene district of Primijme. Yet, the city of 
Trieste was still identified as "Italian". The common call of Liberation Council supporters, 
"Trst je Nas" (Trieste is ours), was an affront to the Italians of Trieste. The first weeks of 
liberation were marred by local skirmishes and violent confrontations ending in killings. The 
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Triestine Italians of the CLN, in the meantime, pressed for Italian administration of Trieste 
and for AMG administration of Venezia-Giulia. 
Tensions also ran high between the Allied Forces and the Yugoslavs. Churchill's 
Minister at Allied Headquarters, Harold Macmillan, foresaw problems resulting from 
cultural differences. On May 14 he said, ''The [Allied] troops in the area will get to know 
and dislike the Yugoslavs. They will see the so-called Yugoslav administration thieving, 
raping and killing, and they will not like it".25 Major Robert Hanley of the AMG observed 
on May I 7 that, 
"Yugoslav behavior in both Austria and Venezia-Giulia is making a 
very unfavorable impression on Allied troops. Our men are obliged 
to look on without power to intervene while actions which offend 
their traditional sense of justice are committed--as a result feeling 
against Yugoslavs is more strong and getting stronger daily. "26 
Allied soldiers observed the behavior of the People's Courts and the 
misbehavior of the Yugoslav troops. The war was over and the soldiers wanted to 
go home. They saw Yugoslav insistence on occupying Venezia-Giulia as the cause 
of their continued stay. The officers became increasingly certain that the Tito regime 
was pro-Soviet rather than pro-Western. 27 Thus many of the themes of the coming 
Cold War era asserted themselves in the initial days of the joint administration of 
Trieste. One was the myth of the totalitarian East as the alien and primitive 
antithesis of the West, the child of Enlightenment and liberalism. The East was 
associated with Byzantine, Balkan, and Slav, terms relegated to a place on the 
margins of civilization. 28 
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The Allied Military Government 
Up until May, the definitive line of demarcation between the Allies and Yugoslavs 
had been left to Alexander and Tito. The Allies assumed that Tito would allow an Allied 
Military Government over the whole of Venezia-Giulia. When this assumption proved to be 
incorrect, Alexander asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff whether both American and British 
governments were prepared to use force to establish military control. Receiving no reply, he 
informed the Chiefs of Staff that he would act according to principles agreed on in Belgrade 
in February. Anglo-American task forces would administer those parts essential to Allied 
military operations. The next day the Combined Chiefs of Staff, with Truman's approval, 
ordered Alexander to establish the AMG throughout Venezia-Giulia, including Fiume. 29 
Alexander informed Tito of his mission, and Tito replied that the situation had 
appreciably changed since the February conversations, and that he intended to liberate Istria, 
Trieste, Monfalcone and the rest of the territory up to the Isonzo, and even up to the 
Austrian border. Thus Yugoslav troops would operate from Grado on the Adriatic via 
Gorizia to Tarvisio and Villach. Tito, however, conceded that Allied troops could use the 
ports of Pola and Trieste and the rail line from Trieste to Tarvisio. Alexander's Chief of 
Staff, General William Morgan went to Belgrade on May 8 with a proposed line of 
demarcation.(Map 17). All Yugoslav armed forces west of the line would fall under Allied 
command and later withdraw from the area. The Allies would recognize Yugoslav civil 
administration of the western part of Venezia-Giulia "as long as it worked satisfactorily". 
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Tito rejected this proposal and began to build up his reserves in the region. On 
May 19 Alexander censured Tito: 
"Our policy publicly proclaimed is that territorial changes should be 
made only after thorough study and after full consultation and 
deliberation between the various governments involved. It is, 
however Marshal Tito's apparent intention to establish his claims by 
force of arms and military occupation. Action of this kind would be 
all too reminiscent of Hitler, Mussolini and Japan. It is to prevent 
such actions that we have been fighting this war". 30 
Both sides poured in reinforcements, and for a while it seemed that only armed 
conflict would settle the controversy. Washington's reaction to this tense situation was one 
of moderation. Under-Secretary of State Joseph Grew and Secretary of War Henry Stimson 
agreed with Truman's reaction: ''I did not want to become involved in the Balkans in a way 
that could lead us into another world conflict".31 The US Ambassador to Allied 
Headquarters, Alexander Kirk, however, repeatedly warned his superiors of the drastic 
consequences in Italy if the original AMG strategy were set aside. The new Italian 
government also protested to the Americans, urging total AMG control of Venezia-Giulia as 
promised. The first post-war Italian government was unstable without decisive leadership.32 
The Socialist Pietro Nenni had formed a coalition with the Communists. Grew pointed out 
to the President the possible impact of a possible leftist Italian government on domestic 
politics, specifically the Italian-American electorate, yet Truman was reluctant to use armed 
force. 33 
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The British Foreign Office strongly favored Alexander's plan for an operational 
compromise with the Yugoslavs, as long as the arrangements did indeed fulfill military needs 
and included Anglo-American control of Trieste. Kirk and his British counterpart 
successfully prevented the United States from asking the Soviets to intercede. Kirk was 
convinced that seeking Soviet concurrence in this matter would establish an undesirable 
precedent. 
By late May, the State Department had settled on its postwar policy on Trieste in an 
emerging Cold War atmosphere. Trieste policy would be guided by three major concerns: 
1. to secure complete control of Trieste, based on upholding the Atlantic Charter principle 
of self-determination and orderly territorial settlement; 2. to prevent further communist 
intrusions and 3. to ensure a democratic form of government and stability in Italy.34 The 
State Department promptly drafted a cable to advise Churchill of the hardening of American 
policy toward Tito. The dispatch of May 11 concluded that Tito should be told that the 
minimum acceptable settlement was complete and exclusive control of Trieste, Pola and the 
lines of communication through Gorizia and Monfalcone by the AMG. With Churchill's 
concurrence, Truman wrote Stalin that he did not intend to prejudice legitimate Yugoslav 
claims to the territory in question, but at the same time, he instructed Generals Eisenhower 
and Alexander to organize a show of force in Venezia-Giulia. 
American policy had reached a critical point. Many members of the Anglo-American 
forces in Trieste had perceived the Yugoslav policies· in the first three weeks of occupation as 
unnecessarily harsh, and they grew increasingly hostile toward the Yugoslavs. The 
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systematic and unconcealed victimization of the local population (especially Italians) by the 
Yugoslav authorities continued. Field Marshal Alexander stated emphatically that any 
solution by which the Allies shared an area with Yugoslav troops or Partisans or permitted 
Yugoslav administration to function would not work. 35 
It was Tito who finally yielded, when convinced that the Soviet Union would not 
support him in any armed struggle with the Allies. On May 21 Tito stated that he would 
accept the Morgan Line, but he demanded that representatives of the Yugoslav army be 
allowed to take part in the AMG, that Partisan units be permitted to remain in the territory 
under Allied control, and that the Allied command act through civilian authorities already 
established. The Allies insisted instead that Tito recall all his armed forces from west of the 
Morgan Line. After further negotiations a compromise was reached in Belgrade on June 9, 
1945. Venezia-Giulia was divided in accordance with the line proposed by Morgan into two 
zones-Zones A and B. The Yugoslav forces would displace east of the Morgan line while 
the Partisan detachments would either do the same or hand over their arms to the Allies. 
The AMG assumed power on June 12. In accordance with the Morgan Line, 
Venezia-Giulia was divided into two regions. The AMG assumed control of Zone A (Map 
18) which included three areas: Trieste, Gorizia and Pola, while the Yugoslavs retained 
Zone B which included the eastern areas of Venezia-Giulia and Istria. Ultimately the AMG 
remained the only government in Zone A to issue orders and decrees and to make 
appointments. Each area (Trieste, Gorizia and Pola) was to have an area president and 
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council. The AMG replaced the Yugoslav system of national committees with the Italian 
system of provincial government, purged of fascist features. The communist power base, 
their civil administration, was in jeopardy in Zone A with Allied occupation. This peril was 
apparent because the urban centers had Italian majorities, and most influential Italians 
opposed Yugoslav administration because they were Italian nationalists and urban 
middle-class supporters of liberal-democracy. 
The united Italian-Slovene Communists of Zone A thus prepared to defend their civil 
administration and develop a giant propaganda campaign claiming Zone A for Yugoslavia at 
the Italian peace conference scheduled within the year. To achieve these aims the local 
communists decided at a meeting of delegates in Trieste on June 4, 1945 to form a united 
bloc for Venezia-Giulia. After the signing of the Belgrade agreement, however, the 
communists concentrated their concerns on Trieste. 36 
The AMG officers who began operating in Zone A on June 12 were charged with the 
responsibility of not only exercising military control but also of bringing stable, impartial 
administration until its final disposition was determined by a peace treaty with Italy. 
Alexander appointed Lieutenant General John Harding, commander of the Thirteenth Corps 
of the British Eighth Army as his local representative. At a meeting on June 20, it was 
agreed that use would be made of any Yugoslav civil administration which was already set up 
and which, in the view of the Allies, worked satisfactorily, but the AMG could change the 
structure, if necessary. The Yugoslavs asserted that the organs of local government installed 
during the forty days were an expression of the wishes of the majority of the population and 
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contended that the AMG was obliged to work through those institutions. The Anglo-
Americans refused to accept this interpretation. 
While the Yugoslavs insisted on keeping their civilian administration, the AMG 
began to replace the administration with its own. Except for its responsibility to the 
Supreme Allied commander, the AMG had to be completely independent, and entirely 
removed from any connection with the Italian government. Laws passed by the new Italian 
government would not apply to the AMG governed areas. At the same time any existing 
Italian laws and administrative practices directed against the minority rights of the Slovenes 
were annulled. 
In an attempt to moderate the persistent discontent of the Slovenes, the AMG 
guaranteed certain fundamental rights to the Slovene population: 1. official decrees were 
written in the Slovene tongue; 2. Slovenes could use their own language in the courts and 
3. Slovenes were permitted to petition the authorities for readopting their old Slovene names. 
The AMG also instituted a program of establishing Slovene schools. 
The AMG conducted a demographic survey of Zone A in September 1945. The 
AMG staff acknowledged that there was no dependable census for the area, but nevertheless 
they used figures provided by the 1921 Italian census, because it was regarded as relatively 
uninfluenced by fascist policies. On the basis of the statistics derived from this effort, they 
assumed that in Trieste the ratio ofltalians to Slovenes was six to one, while in the 
hinterland, Slovenes far outnumbered Italians. 
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Ethnic conflict persisted in both the rural areas and in the cities. Country doctors, 
often Italian speaking, who had worked among the Slovene population for years, were 
rejected by patients who refused to speak Italian with them. Even traditionally Catholic 
Slovenes were hostile to the pro-Italian Catholic hierarchy. The AMG had difficulty in 
implementing its policies in the rural areas where the majority of the population was Slovene 
and biased against both the Italians and the Allies. Slovenes who collaborated with the 
AMG were seen by their neighbors as traitors to a common Slovene cause. In part, this 
view may have been justified, since the AMG purposely hired anti-communist Slovenes for 
their reliability. They were often victims of communist persecution because they had always 
opposed communism and had during the war even sympathized with the fascists. 37 In the 
cities all the parties dominated by Italians, including moderate communists, favored Italian 
national identity. By early 1946, the national PCI under Togliatti's leadership had retreated 
from its support for the incorporation of Trieste in Yugoslavia. However, the militant left 
wing communists remained strictly pro-Yugoslav. 
Much of the ethnic tension in the immediate war years could be attributed not only 
to dispute over territorial rights but also differences as to ethnic identity. Carlo Schiffrer, 
reinforced the idea ofltalian superiority in his study Historic Glance at The Relations 
Between Italians and Slavs in Venezia-Giulia by stressing the Roman-Italian heritage. This 
historical analysis appealed to the Italian middle class and to many of the Italian workers who 
witnessed economic competition from the Slavs, and it set up an antagonistic identities of 
the Slavs and Italians. One was rustic and the other urban. 38 Schiffrer wrote, 
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''The population of the towns are Italian and therefore the flowering 
of the urban economy means an economic and demographic 
flowering of the Italian element." 
According to Scruffier, nineteenth century Italian nationalism during the risorgimento 
renewed Italian culture. The Slavs, in contrast, had a heritage of a "narrow culture". 
Although the Italians (Lombards and Venetians), Friulians and Slovenes were under the 
dominion of the Habsburgs during the nineteenth century, there was no shared nationalist 
ambition between the Slavs and Italians for their cultures were different. With an Italian 
urban majority, the "superior vitality of Italian culture" would ultimately do its own work 
towards assimilation of the Slav minorities. 39 
Thus the post-war situation in Venezia-Giulia was interpreted by the Italians of 
Trieste as a struggle between two cultures. The meaning of the forty days took on 
significance only in the context of the threat to Italianita'. Tito himself represented Slav 
civilization. 4-0 By annexation of Venezia-Giulia into his system it could be expected that the 
region would lose its Italian identity. The events during the forty days, the stories of 
disappearing citizens and of the foibe offered proof Just as the Fascists exploited the glories 
of Roman history, the nationalists in Trieste used the same myth. 
The Peace Talks 
The international peace talks began in September 1945 with an attempt to settle the 
territorial division between Italy and Yugoslavia along ethnic lines. Admiral Ellery Stone of 
the Allied Commission urged that favorable peace terms were essential if Italy was to be 
preserved as a bastion of democracy in the Mediterranean. Alcide De Gasperi, the leader of 
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the Christian Democrats and Premier from 1945-1953, further expressed concerns of a 
resurgence of fanatical nationalism in April 1946. He repeatedly advised the Americans and 
British that unjust peace terms (meaning the cession of Trieste to Yugoslavia) would 
strengthen the Italian extreme right and debilitate the centrist, democratic parties. 41 
A Boundary Commission composed of representatives from Britain, the United 
States, France and Russia went to Venezia-Giulia to determine a line distinguishing its Italian 
from its Slav population. The only deviation to the rule of ethnic delineation was the 
assurance that all states had equal access to the port of Trieste for international commercial 
purposes. 42 In May 1946, after completing its field work and perusing mountains of petitions 
and arguments, the Commission returned to the peace talks with four different boundaries, 
each one reflecting the bias of the various nationalities of the delegation. (Map 19). There 
was very little agreement on the boundaries. The American proposal was closest to the 
Italian claim, while the Soviet suggestion was virtually identical to that of the Yugoslavs. The 
British experts concentrated on written documents. The American representatives found 
contact with the population more useful, but also examined demographic trends since the 
Austrian census of 1910. Both the British and Americans opposed annexation of Trieste to 
Yugoslavia.43 The French, on the other hand, seemed to have had two objectives. These 
were to balance the number of minorities and to trace a mid-path between the American 
and Russian lines. 
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The French line was accepted as a compromise, but it was still regarded as 
unsatisfactory. The Americans and British proposed that Trieste become a "free city". A 
Free Territory of Trieste (FTT) was not a rejection of the ethnic principle; it merely served 
as a better alternative and reflected a shift toward British and American self-interest. Facing 
an increasingly intransigent Tito and the threat of Communism in Italy as well as in the 
Trieste region, the creation of a so-called autonomous region would provide for continued 
British and American influence in the region. This measure would allow the continuation of 
AMG rule.44 
The idea of internationalization offered the opportunity to break the deadlock in the 
Council of Foreign Ministers. After months of impasse, Georges Bidault, the French Foreign 
Minister, suggested setting up a temporary international regime for Trieste under the United 
Nations. The Soviets continued to stall for a time. On July 1, 1946, the Soviets accepted a 
French proposal that Yugoslavia receive all the area east of the French line while the region 
west of the French line south ofDuino (Devin) to Cittanuova (Novigrad) would constitute an 
international territory of Trieste. Secretary of State James Byrnes said "We didn't like the 
free territory ide~ but since this was the only way out of the dilemm~ we were determined 
that the regime would be set up so that it had a chance to work".45 Both Yugoslavia and 
Italy denounced the idea of internationalizing Trieste as unsatisfactory. The Yugoslavs, 
however, accepted the FTT as a better alternative than Italian annexation. The Italians 
insisted that the Free Territory not only denied Italy Trieste, it also cost Italy the Istrian 
coast. From 194 7 on, large numbers of Italian refugees from !stria and Zone B fled to 
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Zone A and asked for repatriation to Italy or emigration. Many blamed the Croats and 
Slovenes for their misfortunes and blindly hated Slavs. 46 
As a result of the Peace Treaty, Italy retained Gorizia, Gradisca, Tarviso and 
Monfalcone, but she lost the rest of her First World War gains-Istria, and Fiume. No 
agreement was reached on metropolitan Trieste. The French line would have given Trieste 
and Capodistria to the Italians, but Capodistria was on the eastern side of the Morgan Line 
and was occupied by Yugoslavs. So the peace treaty simply named the whole disputed area 
as the Free Territory of Trieste which remained divided de facto into two zones: Zone A and 
Zone B. (Map 20). 
Enter the Cold War 
The postwar division of Europe had crystallized when the Italian peace treaty came 
into effect. The implementation of the Free Territory lagged. By the late summer of 1947, 
a governor for the FIT had yet to be appointed. The Italian peace treaty came into force as 
expected on September 15, 1947. It had been assumed that the new Italo-Yugoslav frontier 
would also be established at that time and the autonomous FIT would come into existence. 
In March 1947, East-West tensions grew more pronounced as the Soviet Union tightened 
its grip on Eastern Europe. As East-West tensions wore on, the Americans and British grew 
less concerned to secure appointment of a governor of the FTT, and without a governor the 
mechanism for establishing a civil government in the FIT could not be set in motion. The 
Anglo-American policy makers concluded that maintaining the status quo would be the best 
means of preventing a Yugoslav takeover of Trieste. The AMG argued that the FTT was 
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being used as a means of expanding the pro-Yugoslav movement's popular base and creating 
a pro-Yugoslav bias in the mind of any future governor. In fact, an intelligence report for 
October 1946 emphasized the possibility that the Free Territory might inspire a 'Tiemocratic 
Front" under Communist auspices.47 The real fear for the Allies was not a racial war between 
Italian and Slav but cooperation between Italian and Slav communists for common political 
interests. 
If the Free Territory of Trieste had become a fully autonomous political entity, it 
would have been poised precariously between two Cold War blocs. Instead, its anticipated 
birth on September 194 7 was abortive, and the territory in question remained divided into 
two zones. The most pressing concern for policy makers in Washington would be to ensure 
that their Trieste policies conformed with broader American objectives in the Cold War. As 
no governor had been selected for the FTT, General Terrance Airey, commander of the 
Anglo-American forces in Zone A, issued on October I 0, 194 7 a declaration that the AMG 
would continue to govern under his authority. Ten thousand American and British troops 
would remain in the area. On the same day, Yugoslav military authorities sent Airey a note 
stating that, at midnight, a Yugoslav detachment would move on the city of Trieste and take 
up positions therein. With concurrence of both American and British governments, Airey 
warned the Yugoslavs that if they sent troops into Trieste, he would respond with force.48 
On the next day the Yugoslav government instructed local military commanders not to enter 
the city and informed the British and Americans that it would pursue the matter through 
diplomatic channels. This brief encounter strengthened American policy makers' tendency to 
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view the Trieste problem in Cold War terms.49 The issue was no longer Italian-Slovene 
ethnicity, but one of geopolitics. 
In late October 1947, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin advised Washington 
that in view of the apparent Yugoslav threat, he had concluded that the FTT was not viable 
and he favored the partition of the territory by which the Italians would regain sovereignty. 
To the Americans, the time was not ripe for revising the Italian peace treaty, and they 
intended to support Airey' s efforts to maintain a barrier between the two zones and to 
prevent Communist subversion in Zone A. 
In early 1948, the Cold War confrontation in Europe worsened. The Communists 
took power in Czechoslovakia and the Russians interfered with the flow of aid to Berlin. In 
Italy there was a distinct possibility that Communism (in the form of a Italian 
Communist-Socialist coalition) would prevail in the April elections. On March 6, Washington 
suggested that the French, British and Americans might shortly declare their support for the 
return of Trieste to Italy. On March 20, 1948, the Peace Treaty stipulations were replaced by 
the Tripartite Proposal which promised the return of the FTT to Italy.50 Not surprisingly the 
Yugoslavs protested immediately and the Italian Communists complained that the statement 
was merely an opportunistic electoral stratagem. The Soviets responded that the proposal 
was a revision of the peace treaty and was unacceptable. The tactics of influencing the 
election were successful, however. The Italian Christian Democrats under De Gasperi won 
forty-eight percent of the vote. 51 
127 
On June 28, 1948, the balance of power shifted. Yugoslavia was expelled from the 
Cominform (an organization of the Communist parties of six countries of eastern Europe, 
USSR, plus those ofltaly and France). During the war, there had been conflicts of some 
importance between Tito and Stalin, but these gave way to a period of honeymoon from 
1945 until 194 7 in which Tito was seen by East and West alike as Stalin's most loyal and 
favorite disciple. 52 Stalin encouraged flexibility and diversity among the various Communist 
parties which were told to follow whatever way seemed most promising for them to establish 
themselves in their respective countries. In other words, they were following "separate roads 
to Socialism", as the Italian Communists had done in nourishing an alliance with the 
Socialists. 
The Yugoslav leaders took an independent stand, because the Yugoslavs pursued 
policies and measures that were best suited to local conditions and that were most likely to 
keep Tito and his supporters in power. An appeal by the Soviets to Yugoslav Communists 
to overthrow Tito met with very little response, and most of the nation rallied behind Tito. 
It demonstrated that the Partisan movement during the war had bred a strong nationalist 
feeling. 
Allied policies towards Yugoslavia were conditioned by other major events of the 
Cold War, such as the civil war in Greece.53 The expulsion of Yugoslavia from the 
Cominform surprised the Western powers. They had hitherto perceived communism as a 
monolithic, expansionist movement. With Tito's expulsion, this perception changed. They 
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now saw Communism as a movement that might break up into rival factions, if existing 
tendencies were encouraged skillfully. 
In the immediate years following the split, Yugoslavia was seen and treated more as 
an ideological wedge in the side of the supposedly crumbling Communist monolith. Its 
exploitation fitted into American policy for the containment of Soviet Communism. In the 
summer of 1948, the British Foreign Office produced a ''Bastion paper", which identified a 
defensive line for NATO. Any breach in this line would enable the Soviets to penetrate 
Western Europe and cause the whole line to collapse. 54 .The principal bastions of the 
Western line were Germany, Austria, Trieste, Greece and Turkey. Therefore, the Allies 
were committed to integrate Trieste into the Western European defense system. ss 
With the Soviet-Yugoslav break, Washington assumed a wait-and-see policy, 
deliberately stalling debates on Trieste. As it happened, Yugoslavia also changed its policy 
toward the idea of a Free Trieste Territory in mid-1949, by deciding to favor some sort of 
partition as the only basis for a realistic settlement. Yet the local clash of Italian and 
Yugoslav nationalism created a powerful obstacle preventing a prompt solution along the 
lines of a negotiated settlement. 
Fearful of a Soviet attack on the former satellite and hoping to integrate Yugoslavia, 
at least partially, into the Western defense system, the Americans began supplying military 
assistance to Yugoslavia in 1951. The precariousness of Tito's position made Anglo-
Americans less likely to press on the Trieste issue. Meanwhile, the Italians rearmed and 
sought entry into the European Community. The Italians still hoped for a better territorial 
129 
settlement than Zone A and claimed that less than satisfactory settlement would provoke 
domestic instability and would undermine Italy's contribution to the Western Alliance. 
Foreign Minister Anthony Eden became convinced that the best prospect for early settlement 
lay in partition of the FTT along the existing zones. The Americans agreed, but they were 
reluctant to apply pressure on De Gasperi to modify the Italian position which demanded a 
continuous ethnic line to include coastal towns in Zone B. By late 1952 the State 
Department sensed signs of wavering in Tito's position. It was now America's tum to move 
unilaterally by seeking to devise an alternative compromise solution that might meet Italian 
objections. In December the United States submitted a new proposal that was more 
favorable to Italy: Zone A, Trieste and Capodistria would go to Italy, while Yugoslavia 
would have Zone Band a few Slovene villages in Zone A. The Italians rejected this 
proposal. The British then proposed to allow the Italians to take over full administration of 
Zone A, the withdrawal of Anglo-American troops and replacement by Italian troops. ~6 
The State Department became concerned with the potential results of the 1954 
Italian national election. By turning over the administration and military control of Zone A, 
the Allies would make a de facto return of the city to Italy. This would give the Christian 
Democrats a boost at the polls. The Christian Democrats had suffered considerable losses 
in the June 1953 elections and De Gasperi fell from power shortly thereafter, replaced by 
Giuseppe Pella. Pella put pressure on the United States and Britain to support Italy on the 
Trieste issue by refusing to ratify the European Defense Community (EDC) and even 
threatening to withdraw from NATO. 
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This imbroglio became the crisis of October 1953. The new American Ambassador, 
Claire Booth Luce, saw Trieste as the key log in the Italian foreign policy jam and demanded 
a solution. She warned: 
"For the want of Trieste, an Issue was lost 
For the want of an Issue, the Election was lost. 
For the want of an Election, De Gasperi was lost. 
For the want of De Gasperi, his NATO policies were lost. 
For the want of his NATO policies, Italy was lost. 
For the want ofltaly, Europe was lost. 
For the want of Europe, America----?"57 
The force of this argument impressed Eisenhower, and he considered that the Italians 
have been our friends for a long time and the "Jugs are Johnny-Come-Latelies".58 The 
Americans wanted Italy to ratify the treaty creating the European Defense Community; 
therefore they preferred to back the Italians, without overtly offending the Yugoslavs. At 
the same time, the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, stated in a press 
conference that American policy on Trieste was no longer necessarily bound by the Tripartite 
Proposal and that the United States had been exploring other alternatives. 59 His statement 
caused a furor in Italy, and Luce advised the State Department that failure to find a rapid 
solution of the question will result in great harm to American-Italian relations. Both the 
British and Americans agreed to present Italy and Yugoslavia with a fait accompli by 
declaring they had decided to withdraw their troops from Zone A and to allow Italy to take 
control of the area. 
The Trieste crisis of autumn 1953 owed its origins to the loss of patience by the 
Western powers which after the eight-year impasse is only too understandable. Nevertheless, 
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they made a mistake. Tito wanted the problem to be kept in cold storage. Various proposals 
for a settlement were made between the two parties in 1951-52, but nothing came of them. 
The Western foreign ministers contemplated using financial aid as a lever for getting 
Yugoslavia to resolve the situation, but the Yugoslav press at the end of August 1952 
implied that the Yugoslavs intended to annex Zone B. The Italians responded by moving 
their troops towards the frontier. 60 Tito did not follow through on this threat, but he saw 
that the Anglo-Americans failed to urge Italy to withdraw her forces from the frontier. It 
was an indication of Allied intentions. In September 1953 Tito once more suggested the 
internationalization of Trieste. On October 8, 1953, the British and Americans announced 
imminent withdrawal of their forces, handing over the administration of Zone A to the 
Italians. The untimely and ill-prepared declaration which so obviously favored the Italians 
caused Yugoslav relations with the West to take an irremediable tum for the worse. 
The Italians were relatively satisfied, for they regained Trieste. The Yugoslavs 
however were outraged that they had not been consulted. Tito publicly denounced the 
Anglo-American plan and declared, "we would consider entry of Italian troops into Zone A 
as an act of aggression against our country''61 John Foster Dulles understood the threat that 
Yugoslavia would enter Zone~ despite the presence of US and British forces, if any Italian 
soldiers entered the zone. On October 14, 1953, Eisenhower gave orders for several US 
warships to take up positions in the Adriatic. 
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The situation became increasingly dangerous. Both Yugoslav and Italian military 
sent reinforcements to the border regions. Under the circumstances the Anglo-American 
powers assured the Yugoslavs that there would be no immediate withdrawal of their troops. 
The Yugoslavs suggested a conference of the governments of the United States, Britain, 
Italy and Yugoslavia. There were some obstacles to overcome, but officials worked to 
surmount them. 62 Early in 1954 American and British policy makers finally secured 
Yugoslav and Italian agreement to a formula for organizing negotiations. The actual 
negotiating process began in February with meetings in London with representatives of the 
United States, Britain, and Yugoslavia and the three parties made an agreement in May. The 
Western powers sweetened the pill by promising economic aid of twenty million dollars to 
facilitate construction of a new port at Capodistria (Koper) in Zone B. Now the Allies had 
to meet a new Italian government, headed by Mario Scelba. After a month of negotiating, 
the Italians accepted the proposed terms. On October 5, 1954, representatives of the four 
states signed the memorandum of understanding in London. The departure of the Anglo-
American garrison on October 26, 1954 ended almost a decade of direct involvement in 
Trieste. In the aftemoo~ thousands ofTriestines crowded into Piazza Unita' to see the 
Italian tricolor once again raised over their city. 
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EPILOGUE 
In the years following 1954, while the East and West still confronted each other in 
the Cold War, both Yugoslavia and Italy experienced changes. In foreign affairs Tito 
continued to seek leadership in the emerging Third World movement of ex-colonies, while 
maintaining a balance between centralism and federalism in domestic affairs. When Tito died 
in 1980, the world waited for chaos to break out, but the system of federalism and sharing 
by the ethnic groups planned by Tito's successors worked for a short time. In setting up the 
republics, the communist leadership used a blend of ethnicity and historic tradition, giving 
each component "nation" a territorial base. The Communist Party was the only national 
organization which transcended the bounds of narrow ethnic separatism and could base its 
appeals on ideology. During the war the Partisans were able to mobilize a unified national 
resistance. This unity and discipline made the party legitimate. 1 After the war, nationalism 
was repressed, and the Constitution of 197 4 restructured the government so that strict party 
rule prevailed through the local parties in the republics under the guidance of the aging 
dictator. Tito had known how to balance regional demands for federalism with national 
demands for centralism. After his death the party's legitimacy eroded with increasing 
economic misery and political paralysis. The two historic tendencies of Yugoslav politics 
began pulling in opposite directions. The Serbs tried to tighten up the centralization, while the 
non-Serbs tried to loosen it even more. But the system held on through inertia for a decade 
until communism collapsed elsewhere. 2 
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When Slobodan Milosevic rose to power in Serbia in 1987, the legitimating force of 
Titoist principles had been exhausted and the fear of a resurgent Serbia provoked a chain 
reaction. The election of Slovenian Ante Markovic, as president of the federal government, 
failed to bring a political truce and an attenuation of national passions. The Serbs still 
asserted themselves to a greater extent in the economic and political affairs of Slovenia. For 
example, the Serbs insisted on centralized control of the Bank of Slovenia in 1988. 
In the spring of 1990, the Slovene Communists walked out of the Congress of the 
League of Yugoslav Communists, and the Yugoslav Party fell apart. In June 1991 when 
Slovenia announced that it would secede, the Yugoslav army made a feeble attempt to 
regain control of the international border posts between Slovenia and Italy. After a week 
of tension, the army stayed in its barracks and later withdrew eastward. Elsewhere, in 
Croatia and Bosnia, there were confrontations. It followed that other non-Serbs did not 
want to stay in a rump Yugoslavia obviously dominated by the Serbs. 3 Nevertheless, on 
June 25, 1991, Slovenia became an independent state for the first time in its history. 
In Italy, Italians enjoyed the economic miracle of the Sixties. Although domestic 
politics caused change of governments once a year on the average, the economy grew, and 
the democratic system stabilized. The introduction of television did more in unifying a nation 
in language than any other factor, and despite the move towards greater regional autonomy 
in the Sixties and Seventies, the Italians moved toward greater national identity. In Friuli, the 
economic miracle was especially pronounced. Textile and light industries increased 
urbanization in the centers ofUdine and Gorizia. For Trieste, however, Carlo Sforza's vision 
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of decaying commerce became fact. Cut off from Austrian and Yugoslav hinterlands the city 
has only a shadow of its former greatness. The Croats have developed Fiume, and the 
Slovenes have expanded Capodistria (Koper) to become a major port. 
No longer are there heavy defensive barriers between Italy and Yugoslavia. The 
"training areas" along the border have been abandoned. Only customs personnel patrol the 
frontiers to prevent the movement of contraband. In the fields of banking and commerce, 
the Italians have financed Slovene development projects and have also backed the admission 
of the Slovenes into the European Economic Union. In the reduced lands of Venezia-Giulia 
(the province of Gorizia) and in Trieste, there are Slovene elementary and secondary schools. 
Slovene intellectual life is also vibrant in Trieste. The Slovenes maintain two theaters and 
cultural centers, as well as publish Slovene newspapers. Across the border in Slovenia and 
!stria in the former Italian cities of Pola and Fiume, little Italian is spoken, for the vast 
majority of Italians migrated after 194 7. 
We have observed the development of the Slovene people as they progressed toward 
a separate national state. Slovenia has followed Hroch' s classic model of central European 
nationalism. First the intellectuals became interested in the ethnic, particularly linguistic, 
attributes of a people. This ethnic awareness expanded to the educated middle class through 
literature, and finally, by the power of a popular press, to literate masses. Ultimately, after 
years of dependency upon the Habsburg Empire and upon Yugoslavia, the Slovenes achieved 
their national state, after several attempts to merge themselves in a unified South Slav state. 
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The people ofFriuli, however, did not follow the same path. They recognized their 
particular culture and language, and celebrated it, but they did not proceed to nationhood. 
One reason for Friuli remaining a province ofltaly was that language did not become an 
issue. All levels of the citizenry--intelligentsia, middle-class urban and farmer--used the 
Friulian language in everyday conversation and read it in local journals, but the people of 
Friuli did not insist on the singular use of their vernacular in the schools or in public affairs. 
Friulian is taught in the local schools as a literary language, as the Middle English of Chaucer, 
yet Friulian is a living language.4 The people ofFriuli r~mained content with the 
semi-autonomous government of their region. The different paths taken by the Slovenes and 
Friulians, particularly in their demands or lack of demands for the official use of the 
vernacular, tend to support the conclusions drawn by Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict 
Anderson that nation-building followed a linguistic imperative. Hobsbawm points out that 
the official use of the vernacular was critical in achieving national consciousness in East 
European states. Anderson stresses the importance of spreading the idea of community 
through the mass press, or to use his term print capitalism. Without popular support, ethnic 
and national consciousness would remain arrested at the first or second stage ofHroch's 
model. The Slovenes met both Hobsbawm's and Anderson's criteria and became a 
nation-state; the Friulians did not meet either criterion and remained an autonomous region 
ofltaly. 
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Nationalism and irredentism played their roles in Italy and in Yugoslavia. In many 
ways the fortunes of the Slovenes and the Friulians depended not only upon the policies at 
the national level, but also upon the policies of the great powers in the international arena. 
Prior to the First World War, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, France and Russia all played 
in the power game. After the war, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy exercised 
influence in the region. Finally after the Second World War, the former Allies, the United 
States, Britain and the Soviet Union positioned themselves to gain advantage in the new 
power game of the Cold War. 
This thesis has presented the short history of a regional conflict over a small strip 
ofland where three major ethnic/linguistic groups (German, Italian and Slav) converge. 
For years these peoples lived for better or worse under Habsburg rule. With the 
nineteenth century, the pace of intellectual and economic life accelerated. The intellectual 
movements fostered nationalism and education, and industrialization promoted the 
growth of cities which provided the breeding ground for national awareness among the 
masses. Nationalism, irredentism, and imperialism germinated and reproduced a half 
century of war and international tension. The 1975 Treaty of Osiino peacefully resolved 
the boundary question of Venezia-Giulia. The treaty could not eliminate prejudice and 
mutual mistrust between two neighboring ethnic groups, but demonstrated that 
compromise and accommodation were preferable to conflict. 
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Map 10 
Frontiers 1915-1919 
Source: Clark, Modem Italy 
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Map 15 
Agreed Partition of Yugoslavia, 1941 
Source: Roberts, Tito. Mihailovic and the Allies 
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Map 16 
Friuli in 1945 
Source: Clark, Modem Italy 
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Source: Novak, Trieste 
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Map 18 
Julian Region, 1945-194 7 
Source: Nova~ Trieste 
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Map 19 
Julian Region Boundary Proposals 1946 
Source: Rabel, Between East and West 
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Map 20 
Free Territory of Trieste 1947-1954 
Source: Novak, Trieste 
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